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THE GEORGIAN ROSE REVOLUTION: CHALLENGES AND 
SUPPORTS FOR ENSURING THE NON-VIOLENT 







This thesis is about the Georgian revolution that took place on 23 
November 2003, popularly named the 'Rose Revolution.' It began in 
the form of street protests in the capital of the country against the 
falsification of the November 2003 parliamentary election, and 
culminated in the storming of the Georgian Parliament and the 
resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze. Massive demonstra-
tions were held in Tbilisi 20-23 November 2003 and tens of thousands 
of people participated. Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania, Nino 
Burjanadze and others led the demonstrations that ended with the 
collapse of the government. After an increasingly tense two weeks of 
protests, Shevardnadze bowed to the inevitable and resigned as 
president on 23 November 2003. The parliamentary speaker, Nino 
Burjanadze, replaced him on an interim basis. 
The exceptional feature of this revolution is that Georgia managed to 
overcome the gravest crisis of its latest history without shedding a 
single drop of blood. Considering Georgia's turbulent history and lack 
of strong democratic traditions, the non-violent character of the 
revolution was by no means self-evident. The question is whether the 
non-violent nature of the event was the result of a deliberate and well-
planned strategy, or whether it was mere coincidence. In any case, the 
Georgian revolution attracted a lot of attention from the regional and 
Western media. The important feature of this revolution is that it 
happened non-violently in a former Soviet country. The concept itself 
is astonishing, because a non-violent revolution, or the peaceful 
changing of a corrupt government whose leader has always wandered 
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between dictatorship and democracy, is the starting point for a new 
generation of nonviolent revolutions in the countries who shared the 
same political culture in the past. This idea is supported by the recent 
events in Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005, clearly inspired by 
the Georgian success. Bearing all this in mind, the Georgian case 
provides an excellent opportunity to get insight into and to further 
develop the theories of non-violent behaviour. 
The aim of this research paper is to find out and discuss how the 
Georgian revolution could happen non-violently. This will include a 
theoretical explanation of the strategies and tactics of the protests, as 
well as other factors that in the end made the president resign from his 
post peacefully. The empirical approach of my research is based on 
finding political-legal and economic factors of influence, seeing the 
revolution as a historical event. 
The empirical data collection is based on the Georgian revolution. 
However, this research paper will also refer to the nature of the new 
generation of revolutions with their minimal requirements and their 
demands, support and regulations by international law and community 
and major institutions. At the same time, a theoretical discussion will 
take place about the causes, reasons and legitimizations of the 
Georgian revolution within the broader context of history and the 
economic, political and social situation of the country before and 
during the revolution period. 
 
Research Questions 
The research questions have been formulated in order to serve the 
aims and objectives of the Master's Thesis. Since the aim of the thesis 
is to find out why the Georgian revolution was non-violent, it is 
important to research the specific strategy and methods of the 
revolutionary movement. In addition, it is essential to understand 
which internal and external challenges and supports influenced the 
nature of the November 2003 events. Based on this I formulated the 
following main research questions: "what made the Georgian 
revolution non-violent? What specific strategy and methods did the 
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revolution movement use? What challenges and supports were there 
for the non-violent revolution?" 
 
Hypotheses 
My overall hypothesis is that the non-violent strategy and tactics of 
the opposition contributed to making the revolution non-violent. 
However, these organizational and planning elements were not in 
themselves a guarantee for the non-violent outcome; other factors also 
had to be present such as the tolerant behaviour of the government, the 
lessons learnt from recent history and external factors such as foreign 
pressure and support. I believe that during the events, there was a 
great risk that the Georgian revolution might turn violent, but the 




Sources of Information 
This thesis is based on several sources of information. In the period 
between the outbreak of the revolution in November 2003 and until 
June 2004, I collected and read as much as possible of the available 
written material about the Georgian Revolution. This material 
consisted mostly of informative and analytical articles about the 
revolution, found in official Georgian sources (statements, decrees etc. 
publicized in newspapers, TV and web pages controlled and operated 
by the Government), Georgian and international newspapers and 
books and journals. 
In the summer of 2004,1 made a six-week research trip to Georgia to 
meet real informers, i.e. people who had actually taken part in the 
revolution and who had made decisions. The information has mainly 
been gathered from interviews with high-ranking former and current 
government elites who were 'for' or 'against' the revolution, the neutral 
elite, mass media representatives, academic workers, different party 
activists, NGOs activists, foreigners living in Georgia, ordinary people 
and active students etc. However, the main verification still relied on 
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interviews with those people who concretely took decisive roles 
during the whole processes on the eve of the Georgian revolution. 
 
Target groups 
Generally speaking, the target group of my interviews can be divided 
into three categories: pro, anti and neutral to the revolution. The target 
group consisted of people who physicallv took part in or made 
decisions during the revolution, as well as people who did not 
physicallv take part, but who share common knowledge about the 
events. The age of the interviewees ranged from approximately 22-60 
years. The gender balance, the number of representatives from the pro, 
anti and neutral camps as well as their knowledge about and 
involvement in the event have been taken into consideration in order 
to keep a fair balance. 
 
Problems 
Since the research has mainly been based on interviews it is necessary 
to point out the positive and negative sides of interviews as a 
methodology. The advantages of the interview, for instance, compared 
with self-administrated questionnaires are: a) the verbal interaction 
with the interviewee allows for greater depth than is the case with 
other methods of data collection b) the interviewer can ensure that the 
interviewee sticks to the question, c) the interviewer is able to clarify 
the question in order to avoid misunderstandings. During my data 
collection, it sometimes occurred that the same questions had different 
meanings to different people. It helped to explain questions and to 
'push' the interviewee to stick to the question. 
Meanwhile, the problematic side of interviewing was that some people 
did not feel comfortable sitting in front of a stranger and talking about 
politics. In addition, an obvious disadvantage of interviews as a 
research method is that this method is prone to subjectivity and bias 
on the part of the interviewer
 ii
. There were some problems with the 
chosen methodology, timing and understanding of Georgians' 
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psychology. All these were potential dangers to any academic 
research. 
Another important problem during the fieldwork was that interviewees 
sometimes categorized their answers into "I think" and "Our party, 
organization, institute etc thinks". These answers and views were 
sometimes totally opposite to each other. It made it difficult and 
confusing to understand whose "thinking" they were referring to. 
From this experience it is clear that one needs to view an individual 
and the organization the individual represents as two different entities 
or 'subjects'. In general, available information about something can be 
either subjective or objective because it results from the interaction of 
the subject (perception and cognition of knowledge) and the object (its 
environment). Therefore, the main problem when using interviewing 
as a methodology is that the informant's information about the event 
will always be relatively true; it exists only as a part of a certain 
subject. It is truth from a certain perspective, thus partial and never 




The technical side of the conducted interviews during the fieldwork 
can be divided into two: voice recorded and note-taken interviews. 
Some people did not mind having their voice recorded during the 
interviews. A recorded interview gives the opportunity to listen to the 
same conversation in its entirety over and over again and save it 
accurately. It reduces the chance of forgetting and adding self-
interpretation compared with note-taken interviews. However, there is 
always a risk that the recorder may affect the conscious or 
unconscious self-censoring of the interview so that items are omitted, 
suppressed or twisted. 
 
Clarification of Two Main Concepts 
There are two crucial concepts that need to be clarified. They are 
whether the Georgian Rose Revolution was a 'revolution' or a 'coup', 
and whether it was 'violent' or 'non-violent.' 
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"This was not a people's revolution. It was a coup, masked by the 
biggest street party that Tbilisi has ever seen", Charlotte Keatley 
writes in a comment in the Guardian on 6 December
iv
. During the 
fieldwork, almost all interviewees who were against an unconstitu-
tional change of government regarded the November events as a coup 
d'etat. Their main argument was that several higher officials from 
Shevardnadze's government had cooperated with the opposition 
forces. For the sake of clarification, let me start with some general 
definitions: a) a revolution is a fundamental change in a country's 
power relations, order (government/people) and institutions, e.g. from 
authoritarian to democratic. Whether a revolution occurred can only 
be decided in the aftermath; only then we can see whether institutions, 
power relations and order have changed substantially and perma-
nently, b) a coup d'etat is a sudden displacement of an existing 
government. 
Based on these definitions, one can argue legally that, a coup d'etat is 
always a revolution.
v
 However, according to the general understand-
ding, the difference between a revolution and a coup d'etat is 
determined by the level of mass support behind those who take power. 
A revolution is the result of popular uprisings on a mass scale, while a 
coup d'etat is carried out by a small group of people, usually in or 
previously in positions of power. Relying on this definition, it 
becomes clear why the Georgian case is disputable. 
By emphasizing the fact that the main organizers of the events in 
Georgia, Saakashvili, Zhvania and Burjanadze, had been high-rank 
officials in the Shevardnadze government, and by assuming that it was 
mainly them who initiated the overthrow of the government, it can be 
argued that the Georgian revolution was a coup d'etat. However, I 
want to make the argument that even if it was a 'coup', it enjoyed the 
active and passive support of the majority of the people in Georgia. 
The active participation of ten thousands of people during the 
demonstrations played a vital role in pushing the Shevardnadze 
government to resign, as well as giving legitimacy to the whole event. 
In the democratic presidential elections in 2004,
vi 
Saakashvili received 
96.3% of the votes with an 88% turnout,
vii
 which weakens the 
argument that the November event was a coup carried out by a few 
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elites without mass popular support. This is why I choose to term the 
event a 'revolution', and not a 'coup' throughout this thesis. 
There are also some controversial ideas about the Georgian revolution, 
stressing that it was actually a violent revolution; "the revolution of 
guns but not roses"
viii
 Since all revolutions generally can be character-
rized as violent acts because pressure, force and severe influence are 
part of their nature, there is a need to clarify how the terms 'violent' 
and 'non-violent' are used in the following chapters. From a Western 
perspective, some analysts argue that storming into the parliament, 
breaking the window, beating some of the parliament's members and 
tearing the chair of the president were violent acts. However, the 
Georgian context and especially the gravity of the crisis and the poten-
tial violence which could have been released - or even expected - have 
to be taken into consideration.
ix
 In this thesis, the term 'non-violent' 
refers to the process or act where bloodshed, human causality and 
murdering are absent. Therefore, the Georgian revolution can be 
called a non-violent historical event because - as was documented by 
media and other independent sources - these above-mentioned factors 
were absent from the arena. 
 
Methods and Methodology 
The purpose of choosing this specific case of the Georgian non-violent 
revolution, is in the wider context to find out whether it is possible to 
organize successfully a non-violent, large-scale political event causing 
fundamental political changes in similar societies. This will enable us 
to adjust existing non-violent resistance (combat) theories to the local 
psychology and structures of government in a specific country in order 
to ensure a non-violent outcome (changes). Therefore, the aim of this 
research paper is to find out what made the Georgian revolution non-
violent. 
The methodology of this research is based on the theoretical and 
epistemological context for the investigation and gathering of 
knowledge. As a method, the empirical way, which sees knowledge as 
the product of sensory perception, has been leading. The empirical 
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approach has both deductive and inductive formations. Careful data 
collection, processing and analysis, and inductive theory formation 
comprise the inductive approach, whilst the other way around, i.e. 
comparing data and theories and adjusting the latter to the former, 
comprise the deductive approach
x
. This research is a mixture of both, 
but the deductive approach leads mostly, which means that data 
collected from interviews, publications and analytic presumptions will 
be systematically compared with existing theories, revising the 
theories if they do not agree with the data - data being stronger than 
theory.
xi
 Scientifically speaking, therefore, the tenability of a theory or 
hypothesis depends on the nature of the empiric evidence for its 
support. 
The method of data collection refers to the techniques associated with 
the interpretive model, such as collecting answers to predetermined 
questions, describing phenomena and performing experiments. 
Although collecting data from publications has been an important 
method in this research, the main method of research has still been 
interviews. Generally, the purpose of interviews in this research is 
varied: testing, developing hypotheses, gathering data, sampling 
respondents' opinions and surveying experimental situations etc. Other 
methods can be used to include the more specific features of the 
scientific enterprise, such as forming concepts and hypotheses and 
building models and theories. 
In the academic sphere, the interview as a research technique is 
normally considered as one out of a range of survey methods in social 
research. The interviews in this thesis have a specific purpose, i.e. to 
obtain information relevant to the research, and their content is 
focused on specified research objectives.
xii
 The theoretical and 
academic justification for choosing the interview as a research 
technique in this thesis is that the interview may serve as a) the 
principal means of gathering information having a direct bearing on 
the research objectives. It provides the possibility to find out what a 
person knows (knowledge or information), likes or dislikes (values 
and preferences) and thinks (attitudes and beliefs), b) the principal 
means of testing hypotheses or suggesting new ones, or be an 
explanatory device to help identify variables and relationships
xiii
. 
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At the same time, the question format and modes of response 
associated with interviewing were taken into consideration. At the 
beginning, the main challenge was to find out how a question should 
to be phrased or organized in order to fit into the Georgian 
psychology. Although the research questions, as stated in the 
beginning of this chapter, were set and well formalized, there was still 
a need for extra support questions and quotes serving the aim of the 
thesis in order to let conversation flow smoothly during the 
interviews. Accordingly, the interview questions were put into 
Tuckman's suggested four famous formats: direct and indirect form, 
and general and specific.
xiv
 The sequence of the designed questions 
was from the general and non-specific to the more specific. I agree 
with Tuckman, who thinks that specific questions, like direct ones, 
may cause a respondent to become cautious or guarded and give less-
than-honest answers. Non-specific questions may lead circuitously to 
the desired information but with less alarm by the respondents.
xv
 By 
making the purpose of questions less obvious, the indirect approach 
was broadly used in order to produce frank and open responses. 
 
Theoretical Context 
This section discusses the theoretical basis in terms of assumptions 
and connections to the revolution theories; theories about political jiu-
jitsu, disobedience, mass protest, power and crowd psychology. The 
theories of Gene Sharp, "the methods of nonviolent action, protest and 
persuasion for power and struggle", Johan Galtung, "triangle conflict 
theory" and Gandhi, "non-violent action by marching forces" are 
going to be the main sources for the theoretical input. The purpose of 
theoretical input is to explain the most in the simplest way by 
gathering together all the isolated bits of empirical data into a coherent 
conception framework of wider applicability. The theoretical basis of 
the study builds on three key assumptions: 
1. nonviolent education, training and good management can lead to 
nonviolent behaviour 
2. attitude and behaviour can change or tolerate the situation. 
3. all people have the capacity for inner peaceful decision. 
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The first assumption refers to the nonviolent disobedience concepts as 
defined by Sharp.
xvi
 He thinks that the government is a vital organism 
where the harmony and interdependence make this organism able to 
function and to resist problems. Therefore, Sharp suggests in his book 
"The Politics of Nonviolent Actions: Power and Structure" that if the 
people and organizations ("organs") could rise to show massive 
disobedience, then they would be awakened and overthrow the unfair 
authority. To reach this level, people need to implement nonviolent 
tactics, strategies and methods in order to achieve a fair outcome. The 
underlying idea is that regardless of the obstacles to dissemination of 
nonviolent resistance, nonviolent education, training and tools can 
lead to nonviolent behaviour. 
The second assumption is developed from the conflict triangle theory 
defined by Gaining where a certain attitude (a), behaviour (b) and 
situation
xvii
 (c) are conspicuously present.
xviii 
In this assumption, the 
conflict is a dynamic process where attitude includes the parties' 
perceptions and misperceptions of each other. Here, attitude includes 
emotive (feeling) and cognitive (belief) elements. It is an expressive 
view of the source of conflict. Behaviour is the second component. It 
can include cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation 
or hostility. It is an instrumental view of the source of conflict. The 
third component is a situation, which means a contradiction. Here, a 
contradiction can be experienced as a frustration, where a goal is 
being blocked by something (refusing to confess real election results 
by the government, or disturbing the legalizing of an "elected" 
parliament by the opposition), leading to oppression as an attitude and 
to oppression as behaviour according to the hypothesis (recognizing 
that the events in Georgia had a great potential to turn violent). 
Gaining argues that three components have to be present together in a 
full conflict.
xix
 As a conflict emerges, it becomes a conflict formation 
as parties' interests come into conflict or the relationship they are in 
becomes oppressive. The situation is changeable. It depends on, in our 
case, the Georgian government and opposition attitude and behaviour 
as well as to individual people's behaviour (people may behave in the 
way they tend to behave - like devils or angels, both or neither - 
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depending on personalities, which certainly may be shaped by 
conflicts in the past.
xx
). 
Gaining defines conflicts of interest as either symmetric or 
asymmetric. Conflicts of interest between relatively similar parties are 
symmetric conflicts. In a symmetric conflict, the contradiction is 
defined by the parties, their interest and the clash of interests between 
them. Conflict may also arise between dissimilar parties such as a 
majority and minority or vice versa. In our case, it is the Georgian 
government against the Georgian nation or vice versa. This is an 
asymmetric conflict. Here, the root of the conflict lies not in particular 
issues or interests that may divide the parties, but in the very structure 
of who they are and the relations between them. It may be that this 
structure of roles and relationship (such as the opposition demanding 
the real results of the parliament elections be implemented, insisting 
that they had won a lot of seats in the parliament, though the 
government said no because they did not want to let the opposition 
MPs control the parliament in the future) cannot be changed without 
conflict. 
This thesis is about a nonviolent power takeover where the outcome 
was defined by the parties, their relationship and the conflict of 
interests inherent in the relationship. The conflict (and the triangle as 
an abstraction) can occur if there are at least two parties. Thus, the 
very existence of a triangle (and the conflict itself) shows the 
existence of two or more parties. By analyzing the Georgian case, I 
divided the main actors into two: 1) the opposition movement 
(opposition parties, NGOs, media, external powers, etc.) 2) the 
government (police, military, government officials, armed people 
from Adjara and groups with economic interests, etc). In Figure 1 I 
have illustrated the theoretical model which is developed from 
Gaining's conflict triangle theory, where attitude, behaviour and 
situation have a continuous influence on one another. In addition to 
the triangle theory, I added the internal and external factors 
(challenging and supporting the nonviolent outcome) to the attitude 
and behaviour of the government and opposition. However, I think 
that the external factors had less direct influence on the situation (on 
the people protesting at the rallies and protests) than the internal ones 
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(history, culture and values). Therefore, I do not connect external 
influence to the situation in the model. 
The behaviour of the government and the opposition have similar 
challenges (restrictions): a) the use of any kind of violence will cause 
strong dissatisfaction, both inside and outside the country, b) the 
danger of civil war, c) loss of support from the population, d) damage 
to the prestige of the political leaders and the country. Meanwhile, 
there were some differences in the attitude of the sides, such as 
refusing to hear international and local criticism of falsified elections 
and the government trying to calm the uprising or ignoring the 
protests to some extent. Their attitude was based on the belief that 
these rallies and protests would be the same as many other rallies and 
protests which the opposition had organized in the past. On the 
contrary, the opposition was becoming famous in the country, and 
they started to call for changes to the results until the number of their 
people and real power in the streets turned to their favour. After that, 
they demanded the resignation of the president. Accordingly, to avoid 
direct violence the violent behaviour should be changed, to avoid 
structural violence structural contradictions should be removed, and to 
avoid injustices, attitudes should be changed. Thus, Galtung's conflict 
triangle was chosen in order to focus on the process and actions and 
help find out which factors had the most influential and decisive role 
in avoiding a violent 'Attitude' and 'Behaviour' in a certain 'Situation'. 
The third assumption refers to the Gandhian tactic of 'speaking the 
truth to power', influencing and persuading the power holders. The 
underlying idea here is to raise awareness about the conflict among 
those who are external and internal supporters of the opponents (the 
government and the opposition movement)
xxi
. The Gandhian perspec-
tive claims that "if your opponent has not totally limited your options, 
then you can fight in the most direct way. You can simply start 
carrying out your alternative to the conflict as if you had already won 
the right to do so.
xxii 
But if you use violence as a strategy for political 
change, you end up with a political order based on violence.
xxiii
All 
people have the capacity for inner peaceful decisionmaking in order to 
solve their conflict by changing the structure. 
 





Georgia is situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, in the 
western part of Transcaucasia on the southern slopes of the Caucasian 
mountains, covering an area of 69,700 sq. km. It shares borders with 
the Russian Federation in the north, Azerbaijan in the southeast, 
Armenia in the south and Turkey in the southwest. Georgia is bounded 
to the west by the Black Sea. The population of Georgia has 
diminished significantly during the last years due to emigration, 
amounting today to about 4,7 million.
xxiv 
Georgia's recent history is as complicated and sad as the history of the 
other Caucasian countries. There are many reasons for this recent 
turbulent past and the roots of the problems go far beyond recent 
events such as the independence of Georgia from Soviet Russia, civil 
war and ethnic conflicts. As a result of these turbulent years, Georgian 
society has been deeply traumatized. The factors of traumatization, 
fragmentation, polarization, internal hostility, changing disposition 
into aggression, victimization as an excuse, IDPs, the individual's 




Independence from Soviet Russia 
By the end of the 1980's, when the Soviet regime was weakening day 
by day, Georgians started to think about their independence from the 
communist hegemony. On 9 April 1989 the Soviet Army broke up a 
peaceful pro-independence rally, killing 20 innocent civilians.
xxvi
 
Because of the massacre, the Soviet leader, Mr Patiashvili, who was 
the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, lost his 
legitimacy in the eyes of the people, and was thus replaced by Mr 
Gumbaridze. This shocking event fundamentally changed the political 
environment in Georgia and accelerated the policy of complete 
independence and separation from the Soviet Union. Later on, the 
multiparty elections of October 1990 ended Communist rule and gave 
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power to the "Round Table - Georgia" block, led by Zviad Gamsa-
khurdia. On the 9th of April 1991, the parliament declared the 
independence of Georgia. However, the international community did 





In nationwide elections on 26 May 1991, Zviad Gamsakhurdia recei-
ved 87% of the votes cast and became Georgia's first democratically 
elected president. During the first half of the 1990s, the Soviet Union 
was a sinking ship, but at the same time it was sucking all the 
economical, social and political cooperation and ties down with it into 
the darkness of history. Therefore, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was unable to 
rule the country at that crucial juncture. He did not have a clear vision 
of where to lead the Georgian political system. Gamsakhurdia's mode 
of government caused dissatisfaction among the opposition, among 
Western governments and even in his immediate circle, who all 
regarded him as a 'flaky' nationalist with no experience of govern-
ment.
xxviii
 Gamsakhurdia's regime faced a coup. The coup grew into 
armed conflict between the supporters of the authorities and the 
opposition, which led the country to civil war. The battles lasted two 
weeks and left over 100 fatalities, and, as a result, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia left the country on 6 January 1992. Gamsakhurdia and 
his supporters escaped from the governmental palace and sought 
asylum abroad.
xxix
 Later, back in Georgia, he committed suicide in 
1993. His supporters are known as Zviadists, who were imprisoned 
and prosecuted by the Shevardnadze government until very recently. 
Unable to cope with the many international, economic and other 
domestic problems, the rebel Military Council, who had formed the 
State Council, invited Eduard Shevardnadze to return to politics in 
Georgia. 
 
The Return of Eduard Shevardnadze 
Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Secretary of the Georgian 
Communist Party and former Soviet Foreign Minister, returned to 
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Georgia in 1992. He became Chairman of the parliament after 
obtaining an overwhelming majority of the votes in the elections that 
followed in October 1992. A new constitution was adopted on 24 
August 1995. On 5 November 1995. presidential elections were held 
and as a result Shevardnadze became the President of Georgia. 
Shevardnadze's political skills and prestige both internationally and 
locally gave him the opportunity to be involved in the political life of 
a new, independent Georgia. Shevardnadze's political skills earned 
him the nickname "Tetri Melia" ("White Fox"), while his former 
American negotiating partners, President George W. Bush, Sr. and 
Secretary of State James Baker, reportedly preferred to call him 
"Shevvy".
xxx
 When Shevardnadze joined the Georgian State Council 
in 1992 in the chaotic aftermath of the coup against Zviad Gamsa-
khurdia. He presented himself as being the best candidate to guide 
Georgia through its difficult rebirth as an independent nation. Over 
time, he seemed to have become convinced that his interests and 
Georgia's were essentially the same. Under his rale, a civil society in 
Georgia became well established, and would possibly be better able to 
meet the challenges of the time than had been the case in the early 
1990s. It seems likely, though, that Shevardnadze will be better 
remembered for his contribution to the deconstraction of the Warsaw 
Pact and the Soviet Union than his undistinguished decade as the 
President of Georgia. 
 
Ethnic conflicts: Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
During the Soviet Union, the Soviet Autonomous Republics of Abkha-
zia and South Ossetia were part of the Soviet republic of Georgia, and 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union they became part of an 
independent Georgia. These autonomous republics are inside the 
internationally recognized territories of Georgia. However, during the 
different times under the former Soviet Union there were some legal 
confrontations between the central authorities of Tbilisi and autono-
mous levels, and gradually these confrontations became openly 
hostile. Starting from the second half of the 1980s, Georgian 
nationalism attempted to separate Georgia from the Soviet Union, but 
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at the same time, Abkhazian and Ossetian nationalism aimed at 
separating from Georgia. In Georgia, armed confrontations had begun 
by the end of 1988. Georgia was defeated in the wars of 1991-1993 
and lost Abkhazia as well as a greater part of the South Ossetian 
territories, which made up almost 15 per cent of the country's territory. 
As a result of these conflicts, 300,000 fled and became Internally 
Displaced People (IDPs) and the two territories became centres of 
criminal business and smuggling.
xxxi 
Through the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian ethnic 
conflicts Russia gained influence over Georgia and the Southern 
Caucuses as a whole. These wars left thousands of human causalities, 
a destroyed economy, hostilities and traumatized societies behind. In 
the years following 1993, the Georgian authority tried to keep a 
balanced policy keeping both Russian influence and Western money 
as part of their agenda. 
 
Political Parties 
In 1993, Shevardnadze strengthened his rale by establishing a political 
party, the Citizen Union. The Citizen Union party became the ruling 
party in the country for a long period. It won the country's elections in 
1995 and 1999, but as the Shevardnadze government started to lose its 
legitimacy among the citizens, his party also became weaker day by 
day. The most visible opposition politicians in Georgia that overthrew 
Shevardnadze in November 2003 had been leading members of 
Citizen Union (CU) and personally close to Shevardnadze, holding 
posts as Citizen Union Members of Parliament (MPs) and ministers in 
successive Georgian governments. For example, Zurab Zhvania was 
chairman of the Georgian parliament until he resigned in 2002. He 
topped the Citizen Union party list for the 1999 parliamentary 
election. Mikheil Saakashvili was second on that list and, at the same 
time, chairman of the parliamentary committee charged with creating 
a new electoral system, an independent judiciary and a non-political 
police force. He later became Minister of Justice resigning from his 
post in 2001. Nino Burjanadze was No. 6. She had previously been 
The Georgian Rose Revolution: Challenges And Supports For Ensuring…  19 
 
Chairman of the Parliament Legal Affairs Committee and became 
Speaker of the Parliament after Zhvania resigned. 
Saakashvili was the first high ranking official from Shevardnadze's 
government who resigned, and he went over to the opposition after 
stating that he believed it was immoral to remain part of a corrupt 
government. Saakashvili was loved for being active and having a clear 
past
xxxii
. In the year following his resignation, he founded his own 
political coalition, the National Movement, to contest the 2002 local 
elections. "Saakashvili had very organized party. Maybe it is only 
political party organized [that] existed in Georgia" Muskhelishvili 
said.
xxxiii
 Meanwhile, Burjanadze and Zhvania joined forces to form 
the bloc 'the United Democratic Party', known as the 'Burjanadze-
Democrats' for the 2003 election. Zhvania was unpopular because he 
was believed to have been a corrupt official in Shevardnadze's 
government. It was, therefore, openly accepted that Burjanadze should 
front the party. 
The Revival Union party was created by Alsan Abashidze, the 
governor of the regional province of Adjara. The Zviadists eventually 
formed a coalition with the Revival Union. Revival Union was the 
most serious challenger to Shevardnadze's regime in 1999, and 
became the second largest party in the Georgian parliament after the 
1999 election; however, some sources insist that numerous acts of 
violence and intimidation had been directed against Revival Union 
supporters both before and during the poll. 
In 2001, several leading figures in the Citizen Union broke away from 
the party, and by the time of the election, only 47 members of the 
parliament remained in its parliamentary caucus. President Shevardna-
dze's supporters formed a new bloc, For a New Georgia (FANG), to 
contest the 2003 election. Probably reflecting the absence of sufficient 
funding, FANG's campaign in 2003 was a pale shadow of those 
conducted in the past by the Citizen Union. 
 
20                                                                                                     Ramil Aliyev 
 
Parliament Elections 2003 
On 2 November 2003, Georgia held its fifth parliamentary elections 
(previously held in 1990, 1992, 1995, 1999) since its independence. 
This election was of great political importance for the political 
situation in Georgia. In the four previous parliamentary elections, the 
voter turnout had been fairly steady at 69.9% in 1990, 74.8% in 1992, 
68.2 % in 1995 and 67.9% 1999. However, all these numbers were 
doubtful in their reliability because all the elections had serious 
irregularities.
xxxiv
 Although the quality and fairness of those elections 
varied according to the interviewees, the common belief among 
ordinary Georgians is that there had never been any Western-style 
democratic and free parliamentary elections in Georgia. 
The Georgian parliament consists of 235 seats. 150 are filled by the 
party list while 85 MPs are elected from mandate constituencies. In 
the 1999 elections, 22 blocks and parties as well as another 3000 
individual candidates took part in the poll. The large number of 
political organizations registered in Georgia creates a misleading 
impression. Many of them were little more than names, and there was 
next-to-no grass root political life in the country.
xxxv
 In 1999, the 
election law was amended to introduce a threshold of 7% for a party's 
eligibility to enter parliament. Only 3 parties/blocks managed to pass 
the 7% barrier in 1999 - the Citizen Union (41.75%), Revival Union 
(25.18%) and Industry Will Save Georgia, which scraped through 
with 7.08%. The Unified Elections Code was further amended in 2003 
to allow for a new Central Election Committee and use of an 
additional voters' list.
xxxvi 
Generally speaking, as time passed by and the quality of life failed to 
improve, fewer people went out to vote.
xxxvii 
Due to the profusion of 
parties, their mixed messages and strange alliance - blocs often 
contained groupings of both right and left - people tended to cast their 
vote for the personalities.
xxxviii
 Illegal methods were employed in the 
parties' political confrontation with the regions to suppress their 
political opponents. The government resorted to a method known as 
the 'carousel method', where the same group of voters cast votes 
several times. For example, society was well aware that a group of 
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120 persons used different identity papers and cast votes in several 
districts during the 1999 parliament elections. 
Although this was a clear case of violation of the electoral laws, no 
one, even political opponents, endeavoured to reveal it openly.
xxxix 
On the other hand, leaders of the civil society in Georgia began to 
understand that with the Shevardnadze-led government and the roles 
of the political game, it would be difficult for anyone to achieve 
success through elections. Therefore, there was a need for greater 
dialogue between civic actors and the government in order to identify 
the threats in the electoral process and find ways to overcome them. 
To this end, a strong election-monitoring group, the so-called Fair 
Elections, had been established in the early 1990's. This group became 
active and critical in assessing and monitoring elections. The group 
was funded by a coalition of donors (Open Society-Georgia Founda-
tion, Eurasia Foundation, USA International Development Agency, 
British Council). In the 2003 elections, the group aimed at counting 
cast votes parallel to the election commission. It was the first time in 
the history of Georgia that this was done.
xl 
The findings of the polling agencies funded by the coalition of donors 
were broadcasted by the Georgian TV stations, including the state TV. 
In particular, Rustavi 2 TV as well as the Western media used the 
findings extensively. The primary goal of the poll was the parallel 
counting of votes cast and motivating citizens' activity in elections. In 
the end, the results of the exit polls differed considerably from the 
official election results published by the Central Election Commission 




1. For a New Georgia -21.32% 
2. Revival Union - 18.84% 
3. National Movement - 18.8% 
4. Labour Party - 12,4% 
5. Burjanadze Democrats - 15% 




1. National Movement - 20,7% 
2. For a New Georgia - 14,2% 
3. Labour Party - 14,2% 
4. Burj anadze Democrats -8,1% 
5. Revival Union - 7,3% 
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Opposition parties held a number of demonstrations as a warning to 
Shevardnadze, denouncing the results of the CEC. The demonstrations 
were increased on 20, 21 and 22 November when tens of thousands of 
people demanded the resignation of Shevardnadze. Mikhail 
Saakashvili declared that all negotiations with the president had been 
stopped and that they now had only one demand: Tens of thousands of 
people cried "Resign; Go home!".
xliii 
 
Chapter Three  
 
Factors that contributed to the revolution 
Was the Revolution Necessary? 
The general answer to this question is directly connected to the 
economical, political and social situation both before and after the 2 
November parliamentary elections in Georgia. In my interviews, I 
received several arguments 'for' and 'against' the necessity of the 
revolution. Generally, almost nobody in Georgia appreciates revolu-
tion as a means of changing the government. According to Emil Adel-
khanov, Programme Director, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democ-
racy and Development, "I could perfectly survive without the 
revolution. I did not like the idea of revolution because a) I did not 
like the opposition leaders. I knew very well Saakashvili, and b) I 
have seen how enthusiastically Kmara [the student movement] had 
started to the preparation for the revolution. I thought what they were 
going to do might lead the country into bloodshed or civil war". 
Meanwhile, after the revolution, people felt it difficult to oppose the 
concept of revolution completely as well, because the revolution 
solved the gravest crisis in Georgia's recent history without bloodshed. 
In short, the means had justified the outcome. Michael Saakashvili, 
the President of Georgia, said, "I hope we will not need anymore to 
change government by revolutions in Georgia. We will build a 
democratic country where the need for changing government will go 
through elections". 
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Some interviewees argued that the revolution was necessary, because 
it was impossible to achieve political changes in the country through 
democratic means, namely elections. It was widely believed that 
elections had always been falsified by the Shevardnadze regime, and 
therefore, a nation-wide uprising and mobilization was necessary in 
order to make the Shevardnadze leadership illegitimate, and force him 
to step down. 
Whether the revolution was necessary or not, there were a set of 
factors that made the ground proper for a national uprising to happen. 
The leading argument for many of the interviewees was that in order 
for a revolution to take place, the conditions have to be right. 
Therefore, understanding the political, economic and social situation 
in Georgia before the November events is crucial forjudging people's 
motivation for taking part in the demonstrations and the power 
officials' excuse for showing disobedience. 
 
Georgia's Economic Development under Shevardnadze 
It is absolutely appropriate to draw parallels between Georgia, 
Ukraine and Serbia when analysing the Georgian revolution from an 
economic perspective. Both Milosevic, Kuchma and Shevardnadze 
were undermined not by an economic crisis (which forces society to 
fight for survival, and that, as a rule, distracts society from politics) 
but by an economic catastrophe (where the fight for survival has been 
lost completely). In such circumstances, mobilizing the protesting 
masses was not hard. 
Almost all interviewees, regardless of their political view about the 
revolution, confirmed that if there were two reasons for the revolution, 
one of them would surely be the economic situation in the country. 
The Chairman of the executive board of the Open Society-Georgia 
Foundation (known as the Soros foundation in Georgia), Micheal 
Chachkhunashvili, thinks, as many others in Georgia, that "... to live 
in Georgia under the Shevardnadze government was simply impos-
sible." This point was supported by the secretary of the New Right 
Party (a right-wing opposition party), Shavla Lavudze, and Natela 
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Sakhokia, Director of the Strategic Research Institute, saying that the 
economy did not go anywhere during the Shevardnadze government. 
Starting from 1998, Georgia experienced a severe fiscal crisis. The 
budget was never in balance, and it was unable to meet the targets for 
tax revenue collection. The government did not have exact plans for 
what to do in order to improve the economic situation. The country 
collapsed from an economic perspective.
xliv 
The majority of the people were unemployed, poor and desperate, 
though there was also a small group of very rich people with fancy 
lifestyles, cars and houses that had a quite nice life in the poor 
country. They were mostly people close to the clan, rich businessmen, 
government officials and mafia members. They were all corrupt 
people who had contributed to destroying the country's economy and 
stealing the grants and loans given by international funds to the 
country. According to Natalia Antelava, these grants and loans have 
never helped ordinary Georgian citizens, but they were the engine of 
much of the corruption there. The grants and loans were also 
important because they enabled the government to pay off its 
apparatus and bureaucratic system.
xlv
 In this situation, the West could 
influence the situation in Georgia. On 23 September 2003 the United 
States announced that it was cutting USAID funding to Georgia. The 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund also pulled the plug, 
stopping loans until the corruption in Georgia was cleared up.
xlvi
 The 
withdrawal of such funds meant that Shevardnadze's power base was 
stripped for cash in the run-up to the election in November 2003. The 
lack of funding also contributed to the fact that by 23 November, 
Shevardnadze had been deserted by his security organs as well as the 
army and police. Shevardnadze started to fall from the moment when 
all his channels of financial aid were reduced. By the time of the 
election, the Shevardnadze government was like a rotting door, ready 
to collapse when kicked. This situation made the quasi-democratic 
regime change inevitably. From an economic perspective, it can be 
argued that the Georgian revolution was mostly made possible by a 
collapsed economy where corruption and unemployment were 
steering factors. 
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Corruption in Georgia under the leadership of Shevardnadze was so 
widespread that it affected life on nearly every level. The degree of 
corruption had crippled economic development and attempts at 
reforms. Shevardnadze was unsuccessful in curbing the rapid growth 
of corruption through Georgian society and political processes. 
However, the system of corruption in Georgia was different from, for 
example, the corruption in Azerbaijan and Armenia in many respects. 
Dr Marina Muskhelishvili thinks "...all the leaders of these countries 
are on the top of the corruption pyramid". These countries have 
created a unilateral system of corruption which is controlled by the top 
management, the president. This makes the money flow in one 
direction; towards the current president. Shevardnadze was different 
in this respect. Shevardnadze did not create a pyramid system. "It was 
a chaotic corruption in Georgia during the Shevardnadze leadership". 
Despite very strong laws against corruption, little was done to enforce 
them. The government was corrupted and "...Shevardnadze did not do 
anything to stop the corruption. He himself was not directing this 
system and did not get any of this money", although he was allowing 
his family and people around him to have their businesses (interest in 
oil, in telecommunication, etc). This did not make a unilateral, but a 
multi-central system of corruption in Georgia.
xlvii 
 
Social Development under Shevardnadze 
In May 2003, the Executive Director of the IMF declared that despite 
small growth over the past two years, Georgia was on the verge of 
bankruptcy. Its foreign debt was more than $2 billion. In the year 2003 
alone, Georgia had to pay $160 million alone in interest - a quarter of 
the country's budget. Next year (2004) it would have to pay close to 
$170 million. To boost the budget income, Shevardnadze was forced 
by the IMF to try to increase the prices of goods and services, such as 
electricity and bread. These increased prices struck the poorest part of 
the population the hardest. 
The minimum wage - on which pensions and benefits are based - was 
$10 a month before the revolution. It is reported that 2.1% of the 
country's 4.4 million population lived in extreme poverty - with less 
than $12 a month to survive on. 10% lived a bit "better" with $20. 
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Over 50% of the population got by on around $50. Over a million 
Georgians, a third of the working population, emigrated in search of 
work, many going to Russia.
xlviii 
The conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not solved, and 
remained in a state of neither war nor peace; a cease-fire situation. 
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) -ethnic Georgians from these two 
regions, especially Georgians from Abkhaziya - did not have any 
chance to return to their homes. Shevardnadze was not regarded as 
being strong enough to carry out social reform or fulfil people's 
expectations. 
The level of mistrust in official bodies was rather high in the regions. 
Cooperation with official bodies within the scope of law was not 
considered honourable. The ordinary citizen preferred to solve his or 
her problem using unofficial methods. There was a lack of awareness 
among a large section of the population about their rights. 
Demonstrations and other protest actions voicing social demands were 
rare. Public protest was expressed openly only in connection with 
political issues. These attitudes were reinforced by the chaos and 
corruption in the official bodies. A typical example of violations of the 
law by the state was the violation of human rights.
xlix 
The Human Rights Situation: The most effective steps towards 
human rights protection a government can take comprise the 
elimination of discrimination and enforcement of the equality of 
citizens. In this respect, Georgia under Shevardnadze's leadership 
failed to fulfil some basic human rights for the citizens. In the mid-
1990s, the Shevardnadze government raided political demonstrations 
rather aggressively, where the organizers of such demonstrations were 
the hard-line supporters of ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The 
government justified these raids by claiming that such demonstrations 
posed a threat to the political stability in the country. Surprisingly, 
during the recent years of the Shevardnadze government, cases of 
assemblies being raided by police had become less frequent. However, 
a new tendency emerged: Non-state groups, who for political and 
religious reasons did not share the goal of such meetings, often raided 
peaceful assemblies.
l 
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According to Nino Makhashvili, Director of Georgian Centre of 
Psychosocial and Torture Victims, a lot of human rights violations 
were conducted and complaints received during the Shevardnadze 
period. There were serious violations, such as violations against the 
dignity and integrity of a person. Although there were many 
complaints, pressure and systematic work in order to prevent similar 
cases, the Centre of Psychosocial and Torture Victims and many other 
human rights protection NGOs failed to do anything because the 
system was built for violating human rights and for oppressing the 
people. The system was dependent on these methods in order to exist. 
No one was protected from torture, although the constitution, 
international conventions signed by the Georgian government and 
other laws prohibited torture.
1i 
During the last two years before the revolution (2002-2003), NGOs 
played a very serious role in the democracy building processes of 
Georgia. There were few leading NGOs, but those who functioned 
could strongly influence the decision-making processes of the 
government. Nevertheless, "there were many cases of human rights 
violations during this time too" -assures Nana Kakabadze, Director of 
Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights. According to her point 
of view, human rights violations happened just because Georgia is a 
former Soviet country, which still possesses features from the past and 
cannot become a democratic society right away. 
In 1992-1994, paramilitary formations were not subjected to any 
control. The extent of their connections with representatives of the 
authorities was alarming. This appeared to be a big criminal problem 
for Georgia. In 2000-2001, Pankisi Gorge became a centre of 
kidnapping and drugs and arms traffic.
1ii
 The life harmony of ordinary 
Georgians was disturbed in Pankisi Gorge while the government did 
not take any measures to stop it. In 2001, Russia bombed suspected 
Chechen guerrilla positions in Kodori and Pankisi, regions within 
Georgia.
liii
 Shevardnadze did not manage to satisfy the basic needs of 
the Georgian citizens on whom the country's defence forces depended. 
As a result, when the people rose against him in 2003, the military and 
police establishments that he had nurtured refused to protect him. 
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Georgian-Russian relations: As a result of the catastrophic economic 
situation in the country during the 1990s, around 300,000 Georgians 
fled to Russia in order to earn money or living.
liv
 During recent years, 
these people have become a political instrument for Russia to pressure 
Georgia. Indeed, the critical Georgian-Russian relations at the end of 
the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000 reached its peak by Russia's 
introduction of an unfair visa regime to Georgia.
lv
 This had a negative 
impact on the economic situation in the country. It slowed down the 
flow of Georgians seeking jobs and living in Russia, who usually sent 
money back to Georgia. All this served the creation of a fundament 
for economic, social and political dissatisfaction and a spark for 
uprising in Georgia. 
Civil Society and Freedom: Under President Shevardnadze, Georgia 
earned an unfair reputation as a success story of post-Soviet democra-
tization among many Western observers. The existence of a relatively 
lively civil society had been regarded for a long time as evidence of 
Georgia's democratic qualifications. Although the development of 
independent media,
lvi
 freedom of speech, assembly and manifestation 
was allowed during the Shevardnadze period, the political system 
itself was not democratic, but a corrupted clan-system. Furthermore, 
the impact of civil society was much less apparent outside of Tbilisi. 
If the development of media and NGOs has been regarded as a strong 
contributor to Georgia's transition, the situation with regard to party 
development has been less satisfactory. While civic groups may 
express group demands, they are not structured in such a way as to 
aggregate group interests meaningfully. This is the proper function of 
political parties, which ideally provide an interface between society 
and the political order by shifting and reconciling group interest into 
coherent programs for the government. As already mentioned in 
chapter 2, when parties are many in number (22 parties and blocks 
contested the November 2003 election), they tend to be ineffective 
and highly short-lived, due to differences in their capacity to mobilize 
resources. In addition, Georgian political parties demonstrated very 
little ideological differentiation. This situation lasted until the 
grooming of the Georgian political system during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. The period following the 1999 elections and the 
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resignation of high-ranking officials from the Shevardnadze govern-
ment is the most significant example. 
The development of civil society found its practical expression in the 
close alliance between certain civil society organizations, above all 
those funded by George Soros' Open Society-Georgia Foundation and 
the National Democratic Institute, with the political opposition. Later, 
this civil society would become the major player in the Rose 
Revolution at three key levels: enhancing the transparency of the 
November elections, organizing protests in its aftermath, and third, 
showing protest through the media. 
Dr David Darchialshvili thinks that Shevardnadze was not hard-
handed. Therefore, the media could say what they wanted. The media 
could have asked hard questions, logically suggesting that Shevar-
dnadze or any high-ranking official is corrupt. But the media were 
much less able to publish hard core evidence, showing high-ranking 
officials taking bribes, extorting money from businesses, being friends 
of criminals, imprisoning people illegally or ordering people tortured. 
From time to time, the media openly accused chiefs of power agencies 
of corruption and cultivating human rights violations, but mostly with 
little real evidence. Generally, investigative journalism remained on a 
low scale, though it was not totally absent.
lvii
 This situation made 
Georgia a politically active and dynamic country where both freedom 
and threats were present. 
 
External factors 
A very important factor both as strategy/tactic and challenge/support 
to government and opposition was the increasing role of outside 
influence. There were several reminders from the West to the 
Shevardnadze administration, e.g. elections should be democratic, 
there was a wish for stronger leadership, high-level meetings with 
opposition leaders, visits by big names etc. Interestingly, at the 
beginning this kind of diplomatic messages and pressures was 
relatively natural in character, but later it shifted in favour of the 
opposition. The West continuously wished for stronger leadership 
during the high-level meetings with opposition leaders, while 
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Shevardnadze, at the same time, "admit[ed] that Georgia failed to 
meet some of its commitments.
lviii
 It was obvious that the West was 
interested in having a new leader in Georgia. Evidence of this was that 
the West supported the opposition parties economically in their 
election campaigns. 
Another interesting fact was that the Georgian revolution came at time 
when the Moldovan government looked ready to accept a Moscow-
drafted plan that would re-unite Moldova and Transdniester, but as 
part of a very loose federation. The United States deemed it necessary 
to activate its role and perform some political engineering in the post-
Communist world. Georgia was another poor, failed state, which also 
had a "frozen conflict", Russian "peacekeepers", and ongoing energy 
deals with Russia. In this situation, the United States and other 
Western governments started to use heavy diplomatic pressure to 
encourage greater democracy in Georgia.
1ix 
It seemed Washington 
believed that Shevardnadze, in spite of all his years of pro-Western 




Georgy Khelashvili thinks that as an outsider factor "...the only power 
that played a significant role was the USA". Indeed, the interference 
of the USA played a great role. It started with public statements 
saying that the USA was interested in democratic parliamentary 
elections in Georgia. A visit of the former U.S Secretary of State 
James Baker to Georgia on 5-6 July 2003 aimed at sending a message 
to Shevardnadze saying that the election must be conducted 
democratically. Understanding the importance and seriousness of this 
visit, Shevardnadze admitted "...President Bush assigns to James 
Baker only entirely special missions, the missions which are of great 
importance for the United States of America itself."
lxi
 These kinds of 
messages were sent by US President George W. Bush and Secretary of 
State Colin Powell to the Georgian government. It seems Shevar-
dnadze also understood that the West's wishes for stronger leadership 
in the country. In the speech of President Shevardnadze's weekly radio 
interview on 7 July 2003, he admitted that during James Baker's visit 
to Tbilisi, Baker had a meeting not only with the president of Georgia 
but also with the opposition! He also noted that "...[he] sincerely 
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welcomed this fact. As he [James Baker] himself said, it was a very 
useful and essential meeting on the whole". 
The civil society groups and the political opposition used this opportu-
nity to unify their resources against the Shevardnadze government. 
The civil society groups were backed by significant Western funding, 
reflecting the USA's strong interests in the region. Almost all the 
interviewees agreed that the political opposition could not have 
achieved the revolution on its own, had there not been external 
funding available. Supported by external funding, key elements of 
civil society and the media especially provided vital coordinating 
functions beyond the capacity of the political parties organizing the 
protest movement.
lxii 
External factors also contributed to limiting Shevardnadze's choices of 
action, namely, using ruthless methods against the population. In 
neighbouring Azerbaijan and Armenia the governments knew that "if 
they beat somebody, namely demonstrators, as a 'dog'
lxiii
 nobody 
would blame them". Therefore, the presidential elections in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, which both took place in 2003 before the Georgian 
revolution, were accompanied by violence, organized and committed 
by the authorities. In Georgia, however, the situation was different. 
"Even beating demonstrators with rubber sticks would sound like 
violence against democracy", Adelkhanov said.
lxiv
 It looked like 
somebody either from the USA or Europe told Shevardnadze during 
the November events that "my friend, if you beat demonstrators now, 
then say bye to our friendship. If you use violence, then we will leave 
you alone with your opposition and you should make your own 
destiny. Some message of this kind was surely sent to Shevar-
dnadze."
lxv
 Therefore, external pressure was an important factor in 
making the November events non-violent. 
 
The Factor of Personality 
It has also been argued that the factor of personality played an impor-
tant role in mobilizing and uniting people against the government. 
Vitali Silitski thinks that the job is easier when charismatic leaders 
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emerge from the opposition's ranks. That is what happened in Georgia, 
with Saakashvili, and in the Ukraine, with Yushchenko and 
Tymoshenko. In these two countries, it was the leaders who unified 
the opposition. Both Saakashvili and Yushchenko emerged on the 
political scene and attracted public attention as former top-level 
officials of the regimes they subsequently overturned. However, 
things worked the other way around in Serbia, where the opposition 
first unified and then committed itself to working together with a 
candidate who could beat Milosevic. Though hardly a charismatic 




Almost every interviewee recognized that Saakashvili had provided 
very good management during the revolution. "He has very much 
impressed with his skills", Dr Marina Muskhelishvili said.
lxvii
 For 
example, referring to Saakashvili's tactics, she describes how people 
were standing in front of governmental buildings but Shevardnadze 
was not responding at all to the demands of the demonstrators. 
Nothing was happening. Indeed, Saakashvili wanted people to stand 
there peacefully, but not to go home. Therefore, he invented 
something, like "...now we should go to ... shouting Shevardnadze 
qadadeki-qadadeki
,lxviii
... [and after standing there for a while] ...now 
we should go to the electoral committee building and shout there". In 
terms of achieving a result it was an absolutely pointless move, but in 




Besides this, Nino Makhashvili says that Saakashvili, compared to 
Zhvania and Burjanadze, was like a teenager who forced his way 
through the corruption. People did not have much trust in Zhvania and 
Burjanadze, but they followed Saakashvili. The Georgian people and 
the West believed in his 'war against corruption'. He is a populist and 
spontaneous guy. "...We could not run after him because he was very 
fast and with changing decisions". He has no control and he has a 
talented, psycho-type personality but Georgians like this kind of 
person. 
lxx
 The argument is that besides Saakashvili, there was nobody 
else who could 'fight' against the old-structured system. People 
believed that he might be able to destroy the Shevardnadze regime. 
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Shevardnadze also contributed to the realization of the revolution, 
partly by his mistakes, and partly by not being ruthless enough. One of 
his greatest mistakes was that he did not name anyone as his 
successor. Dr Muskhelishvili thinks that this mistake was his personal 
contribution to his own fall. "Everybody knew that it was his 
[Shevardnadze's] last term of power. Everybody knew somebody 
would come after Shevardnadze". This made Shevardnadze's officials 
very uncertain about their future, and who would be the next 
president. Therefore, they started to find alternatives and 'shields' 
against future pressures. They started to play the game of balance of 
power. "Some of them were bribed or offered a post after the 
Shevardnadze period by the opposition..." on the condition that they 
cooperate with the opposition. Another big weakness of Shevardnadze 
was that his own government, although it was corrupted, was not 
under his control.
1xxi 
One additional factor is that Shevardnadze failed to use his legal rights 
to stop the demonstrations. Although Article 25 of the Constitution of 
Georgia states that: 'Every individual ...has the right to hold a public 
assembly without arms either inside or in the open air without prior 
permission', the Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations adopted in 
1997 requires people to submit a notification before conducting an 
assembly. The application, which organizers of such events must 
submit to local government bodies, must indicate the purpose of the 
assembly, in addition to other information. Assemblies or manifest-
ations without permission from the government are considered illegal. 
According to the Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations "...the 
authorities shall have the right to break up a public assembly or 
manifestation in case it is considered illegal."
lxxii
 Local governments 
have an authorized right by law to turn down applications if the 
purpose of the assembly is considered to be inconsistent with the law 
(the law does not specify what is consistent with the law and what is 
not
, lxxiii
). These contradicting laws gave a legal base to Shevardnadze 
to show ruthlessness in breaking up demonstrations from a very early 
stage as well as later, but he failed to use this opportunity. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, this can partly be explained by 
external pressures, but his personality also needs to be taken into 
consideration. In May 2004, as Saakashvili was struggling to bring 
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Adjaria under Tbilisi control, Shevardnadze urged Abashidze to step 
down peacefully: "Resign as I did, don't shed people's blood." This 
indicates that Shevardnadze's personality was not ruthless. 
Alexander Lomaia, executive director of the Open Society - Georgia 
Foundation during the revolution, notes that: "We deseeded society 
and had mobilized polar power resources to send a very clear message 
to the government [stating] that we are not going to tolerate any 
intendment of the electoral poll, like, any factor of hijacking the 
elections...we were really trying to get a message out [stating] that 
fundamental democratic changes are needed." The most important 
stimulator of the suggested democratic changes was the above-
mentioned factors, which also determined the nature, time, duration, 
place, strategy and tactics for the Georgian non-violent revolution. 
 
Chapter Four 
What strategy and tactics did the opposition movement and 
government use? 
"If Shevardnadze refuses to acknowledge the true election results he 
will meet the same fate as ... Slobodan Milosevic"- Mikheil 
Saakashvili 
There are many different opinions and arguments about the strategy 
and tactics of the Georgian revolution. The main divergence is 
whether the Georgian revolution was planned, or whether it came as a 
surprise to the opposition and the authorities. If the revolution was 
planned, the strategy and tactics were logically set and prepared 
beforehand. In this case, the question "which specific strategy and 
methods did the revolutionary movement use" will seek its answer in 
the sequence of organized events that took place in Georgia before the 
revolution. Or if the Georgian revolution was not planned, the strategy 
and tactics appeared according to the demand on the field. Then the 
same question will seek its answer in all the spontaneous decisions 
and acts which served the unexpectedly successful non-violent 
outcome. 
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Starting from just after the elections, the aim of the protests at the 
beginning was to demand the real results of the parliamentary election 
from the election committee. For example, Georgy Khelashvili, 
consultant to the Georgian Parliament, argues that Saakashvili did not 
intend to protest at the beginning because "...he was quite happy with 
even the falsified results of the November 2 elections". He was 
winning. His party could get seats in the parliament, but other 
democratic parties who were left behind the 7% barrier went out to the 
streets to demonstrate. "Only after that, Mr. Saakashvili joined the 
forces..." Khelashvili said. Natela Sakhokia, the Director of the 
Strategic Research Institute, assumes that the "...tactics of the 
Georgian revolution appeared according to the demand on the field". 
Since the united opposition had declared the elections defaulted, they 
were not sure whether the elected opposition party members should go 
to the parliament or not. Shevardnadze was going to legitimize the 
new "elected" parliament in very few hours. "I can remember 
desperate and uncertain faces. I can remember some divisions between 
compatibilities, passions and criticism among the opposition" said 
Georgy Khelashvili. A Kmara activist said that he knew that "... 
according to information from inside [the opposition camp], Zurab 
Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze were pretty moderate. They were 
saying we should stop everything""
1xxiv
 and they were more 
negotiation oriented. The huge number of people participating in the 
demonstrations made the opposition camp and the demonstration 
organizers confused and stressed. The large crowds were a clear 
message to the government as well as to the opposition that they have 
demands from them. They demanded the government resign, and at 
the same time they demanded the opposition make their wish come 
true. Masses of people were standing in front of the parliament and 
some other governmental buildings starting almost immediately after 
the elections till 23 November, without anything happening. I would 
say that this was more stressful to the opposition than to the 
authorities. The demonstration had declared its peaceful nature and 
was not going to give a free hand to bloodthirsty people among 
demonstrators or to the peaceful mass to find alternative methods in 
order to shake the ignorant authorities. There was an urgent need to do 
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something important. Therefore, the idea to storm the parliament was 
spontaneous and the only way out from the dead end. 
On the other hand, almost all interviewees who were against the 
revolution and some who were for the revolution argued that the 
revolution was planned. Shevardnadze did not have a clear idea of 
who would be his successor, someone whom he could push forward to 
win the presidential election in 2005 (As opposed to his colleague 
Boris Yeltsin, who in 1999 ensured Putin's rise to power in Russia, 
known as the heritage plan). He failed to unify Georgia under central 
authority; instead he was waiting for the result of the inner 'fighting' 
within his own power pyramid. Whoever was at the top would become 
president.
lxxv
 The opposition did not want to miss this chance to use 
the authorities' uncertainty. Opposition members knew that the 
competition with rich and corrupted government officials for the 
president seat in 2005 would be very challenging. In countries like 
Georgia, it is a common tactic that Majoritarian MP candidates pay, 
distribute food, oil etc. or threaten people on the eve of elections in 
their electoral districts (especially in the countryside) in order to make 
people come to the election stations to bring about artificial success in 
the "elections".
1xxvi 
If Geor gian politicians could easily attract people 
with money, goods or threats, then this tactic could be used to buy 
votes in the presidential election as well. Even during his weekly radio 
interview, on 7 July 2003, Shevardnadze admitted this fact by saying 
"...if we do not rule out the shameful practice of bribing voters, we 
will not be able even to think about the fairness of the elections". In 
this case, the rich government-nominated candidate would logically 
win against his or her opposition colleague with the help of the 
financial and other resources he or she possesses. Thus, the opposition 
planned to make political changes before the 2005 presidential 
election. 
Ramashvili also argues that there were plans to make political changes 
in the country. He claimed that the Liberty Institute had started to 
build the fundament for the changes in Georgia one or two years 
earlier. Kmara activists and some other opposition leaders participated 
in training abroad on how to conduct non-violent demonstrations and 
how to control them.
lxxvii 
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The research has shown that the revolution had planning and 
organizational elements, but it also seems that strategies and tactics 
emerged according to the demands on the field. The following 
paragraphs will give an overview of the most visible strategies and 
tactics that led to the Rose Revolution. 
 
Opposition Movement Strategy 
Since strategy as a phenomena can be defined as a set of plans for 
achieving a definite goal, then obviously the strategy of the opposition 
was different from the strategy of the authorities. From the opposition 
perspective, there could have been three strategies during the events 
taking place between 2-22 November in Tbilisi: 
1) Bring Mikheil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania one step closer to the 
power and promote their position within the political opposition and in 
society.
lxxviii
 The opposition planned to reveal the real results of the 
parliamentary elections, and thereby create promising ground for 
winning the 2005 presidential election, bearing in mind that few 
people generally expected Shevardnadze to stay in power till the 
coming presidential elections in 2005.
lxxix 
2) Declare the parliamentary election falsified to make the Shevard-
nadze government a less legitimized authority in the eyes of the 
international community and the Georgian people. The primary 
hypothesis for this strategy was that the international community 
would start to put pressure on the Shevardnadze government to reform 
and open a competitive environment for the 2005 election 
3) Make revolution and change the government using the falsified 
elections as a legitimization. The opposition parties knew that 
changing the government legally through elections was impossible. 
The government had falsified every election result since they came to 
power, and people's participation and expectations in every election 
was declining. The parliamentary election was a good opportunity to 
legitimize their plan and get international -upport. There was a need to 
save Georgia from a crisis.
lxxx 
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However, one of the key players of the Georgian revolution. 
Alexander Lomaia, thinks that the opposition had no set strategy for 
the November 2003 elections, and that no one had planned this 
revolution. According to Lomaia, the opposition had some plans for 
March and April 2005, connected with the upcoming presidential 
elections, but their strategy was in fact an 18-month strategy. In 
general, people were fed up with poverty and the lies and corruption 
of the Shevardnadze government. The situation on the ground was 
getting ready for a revolution, but no one could have expected that the 
government would go as far as hijacking the elections. Lomaia argues, 
"If the results of these elections were a little bit closer to the reality, 
then there would not be expected big chaos or ... mass protest".
lxxxi
 
From this perspective, it can be argued that the strategy of the 
opposition in this case emerged from the demand on the field rather 
than from long-term plans. 
 
Government strategy 
From the authority's perspective, the strategy can be divided into two. 
1) Strengthen the legislative organ with MPs from the authority. By 
doing this, Shevardnadze was aiming to secure his own remaining 
presidency period till 2005. 2) Secure the majority in parliament. This 
would produce the possibility to legalize any law or act that met the 
government's interest. This would again create a friendly environment 
for government interests in the 2005 elections. 
Actually, it is obvious that these two government strategies failed. 
First, Shevardnadze ruled the Citizen Union party, which took control 
of the parliament during the 1999 parliamentary election. His party 
was incomparably weak during the November 2003 elections. As I 
have mentioned in chapter two, starting from 2001 a group of high-
ranking members of the Citizen Union party left Shevardnadze in 
order to create new, alternative parties. Second, Saakashvili led the 
National Movement (the largest opposition party) and 
Zhvania/Burjanadze led the Burjanadze-Democrats block (the second 
largest opposition party). They criticized Shevardnadze in every 
possible situation, describing him as a symbol of evil, and saying that 
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he had helped some people to become wealthy, while the levels of 
poverty were rising greatly in Georgia. Their popularity among the 
people was increasing rapidly, while Shevardnadze's party was losing 
its support. Third, The National Movement and the Bur)anadze-
Democrats block had a pro-American orientation and were strongly 
supported by the US. The West was interested in democratic elections, 
therefore there were strong diplomatic pressures on the Shevardnadze 
government. The West was limiting government resources to avoid 
Shevardnadze hijacking the elections. Fourth, there were many NGOs 
that struggled against Shevardnadze, and most of their projects were 
sponsored by the Soros Foundation, UNDP, USAID and other 
Western foundations and organizations. NGOs also played a 
significant role in stopping or disturbing the realization of the 
government's strategies. 
As mentioned, the Shevardnadze government was not able to falsify 
the elections and achieve the strategic goals mentioned above. 
Following simple logic, one can say that since Shevardnadze's party 
had used falsification, and there had never been fair elections in the 
country, it was not essential for the government representatives to be 
popular either. This might explain why they put less effort into ma-
king election campaigns for themselves compared to the opposition. 
The government representatives had less popular support in society. 
However, although there was tremendous outside and local pressure 
on the Shevardnadze government, this pressure was in fact limited in a 
way because the country's power and resources were still gathered in 
one hand, which in a way supported Shevardnadze's strategy 
 
Opposition movement tactics 
The theory of political engineering describes tactic as a political 
movement or steps forward to the realization of the goals and 
objectives of a given strategy. In other words, political tactics are tools 
for the strategy. Since there are arguments that the tactics of the 
Georgian revolution appeared according to the demand on the field 
and that there were a lot of spontaneous decisions and situations, I 
would say the tactics of the Georgian Revolution are numberless. 
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However, there was a set of tactics which was more obvious and 
decisive to the outcome. These are the 13 most important tactics used 
by the united opposition movement. 1) Declare all their actions non-
violent. 2) Use civil participation, disobedience and demonstrations as 
the main methods of protest. 3) Pull out huge crowds to the 
demonstrations and meetings. 4) Organize places to stay and sleep for 
demonstrators who came from the countryside. 6) Promise 
economical, social and political security in the future to the people if 
people come out to defeat the corrupted government. 7) Discredit and 
dissolve the prestige of Shevardnadze among people. 8) Use the media 
as a tool against the government. 9) Achieve a common idea and unity 
in the country among different groups which oppose the government. 
10) Attract the civil society and use their resources. 11) Campaign 
saying that the western-educated, new generation of politicians is 
aiming at fighting the corrupt government. 12) Have both secret and 
open talks with powerful officers in order to make them show 
disobedience to Shevardnazde. 13) Attract the attention of the 
international community and get heavy diplomatic pressure placed on 
the Shevardnadze government from abroad. 
Most of the interviewees confirmed that the key point of the Georgian 
revolution is that defending democracy is ultimately in the hands of 
the people. The primary goal of these protests and demonstrations was 
to pressure the government and attract the international community's 
attention to the hijacked election results. Therefore, the opposition had 
a set of tactics concerning the people and how to motivate them for 
the demonstrations. From this perspective, the most tactical political 
gesture by the opposition was to declare their intentions and attempts 
entirely non-violent. However, there were still problems getting the 
protest going despite the fact that it would be a 'public good', i.e., even 
if the protest succeeded in securing justice, everyone would benefit 
whether or not they bothered to take part in the protest.
lxxxii 
At the 
beginning, Georgian society faced collective action problems: for the 
individuals, it made more sense to free-ride on the efforts of others. 
The economic theory of conflict argues that the collective action 
problem for a justice-seeking opposition is usually challenging 
because organizing the collective actions is closely interconnected and 
interrelated to the recent history, tradition, the economic, social and 
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This was a problem during the protests and demonstrations because 
there was a fear that the government might punish people who took 
part, unless there were so many people that the number ensured safely. 
People characterized the demonstrations and meetings as insecure and 
a source of potential violence. (Although some say it was never 
dangerous to take part in demonstrations in Tbilisi during the 
Shevardnadze period.
lxxxiv
) Further, in order to protest, most people 
will lose a day of income (although there were many jobless in 
Georgia as well). This is one reason why a high proportion of 
protesters is usually students. Although students were not the biggest 
part of protesters in Georgia, in a broader context, the Kmara student 
movement was a vital source of free and flexible people for 
demonstrations. 
Generally, the tactic that mostly ensured the success of the revolution 
was organizing mass demonstrations. The number of demonstrators 
was vital for ensuring the non-violent behaviour of the authorities. 
There was a great risk that the Georgian events would become violent, 
since there were confrontations between people and the police (and 
some Special Forces soldiers and officers). The police and the Special 
Forces were ready to implement orders to use violence at the 
beginning of the rallies, but as the number of protesters increased, 
they started to take the people's side. The number of demonstrators 
also affected the Government's decision to step down peacefully. 
Specifically, the tactic of the united opposition was to bring people 
actively from the districts to the capital, organizing transportation as 
well as places to stay. This tactic was the starting point for the 
psychological "war" between them and the government. The oppo-
sition knew that a huge number of human resources would win the 
first stage of the psychological war. Second, the opposition worked 
hard to convince people that demonstrations are safe. The appearance 
of the opposition leaders every day in front of the mass destroyed the 
myths saying that political parties are not reliable and that they pose 
dangers for the stability. Third, the united opposition managed to 
reduce the stress and tensions during the demonstrations. The most 
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common tactic, in this respect, was to invite famous actors, musicians 
and dancers to the demonstrations. It helped to create a party mood in 
Tbilisi and a lot of people went out so as not to miss this tun. Charlotte 
Keatley in The Guardian has also written that it was "...the biggest 
street party that Tbilisi has ever seen".
1хххv 
Nino Makhashvili thinks, "...[The Georgians'] biggest trouble is that 
we are not competition-oriented people". Georgians did not believe in 
communism but they just pretended to. This double game left a 
scratch in the Georgians' mentality. During the period of Shevar-
dnadze, Georgians lost their feeling of involvement in the decision-
making. "We became passive receivers. We could not understand that 
we should not wait. We should work and request harder".
lxxxvi
 In this 
respect, involving people in politics and explaining to them why they 
are important in bringing about changes to Georgia was an important 
political tactic played by civil society and the opposition. 
Analyzing the dynamics of protest shows that a successful protest is 
the one that escalates, and that this depends on a flow of participants. 
However, if one aggressive act happens, it could cause the collapse of 
the whole event. Therefore, the whole power of the Georgian Rose 
revolution is that it was peaceful. Suppose the potential supporters of a 
protest were ranked in order of their willingness to take personal risk. 
The most eager supporters joined the protest first, at the stage when it 
was small and it would be easy for the government to victimize the 
participants. Each time an additional supporter joined the protest, the 
risks of punishment for participation went down. The flow depended 
upon the reduction in this risk inducing enough people to change their 
minds and join the protest, making the risk of falling even further, 
inducing another group of people to change their minds. Therefore, in 
the end there were around 100,000 people outside during the 
demonstrations on 22-23 November. 
Kuran suggests that the tactic of crowd gathering is more likely to 
work in fairly homogenous societies. In such societies, there will be a 
dense continuum of opinion. Many people will be on the margin of 
changing their minds and thus will be swung into action as the risk of 
government punishment starts to fall. By contrast, if the society is split 
into many different groups who see the concerns of other groups as 
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irrelevant to their own, instead of a continuum of opinion there is 
crowding together broken by gaps. As soon as the flow reaches the 
first gap it stops. One implication of this insight is that the societies in 
which protests often fail to gather momentum are those which are 
diverse.
lxxxvii
 The Georgian case seems to contradict this theory, 
because it is a heterogeneous society, consisting of several ethnic 
groups. However, there was no such extreme division between them, 
such as in the Ukraine, where the theory is more applicable. During 
the presidential elections and the following protests in November-
December 2004, the whole of Ukraine was divided into eastern and 
western camps (eastern camps consisting of more Russian-speakers) 
as well as into the supporters and opposers of the opposition and 
government candidates. Nevertheless, the massive crowds gathering 
were large enough to bring on a change of government, and in this 
respect Koran's theory did not come true. In addition, right after the 
Georgian Revolution, some experts said that if Ukrainians wanted to 
follow Georgia's example, they would need ideas, unity, strategy and 
tactics and - as Georgians and Serbs demonstrated - a mastery of the 
techniques of protest. 
lxxxviii 
These experts were in the end contradicted 
by the Ukrainian events, because it seemed that nationwide unity was 
not as important as other factors, such as external support and masses 
of people. All this shows that an ethnically homogenous society is not 
needed in order to gather masses of people in demonstrations. The 
Georgian and Ukrainian cases show, however, that a heterogeneous 
society can become homogenous on particular issues. 
The economic situation also influenced the tactics used by the 
opposition: The opposition leaders were promising new work places, a 
promising future to the people and an uncompromising stand against 
corruption. Saakashvili made his position clear by saying that "We 
must root out corruption. As far as I am concerned, every corrupted 
official is a traitor.. ."
lxxxix
 Unemployed people with no economic hope 
in the future found it motivating to join the opposition activists 
selflessly. It is quite reasonable to think that the reason for their 
motivation was that they were hoping to be rewarded with work if the 
opposition succeeded. 
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Emil Adelkhanov makes this point well by telling "...there were three 
strong arguments and topics where two of them probably attracted 
people's attention" from an economical perspective. They are: 1) 
messages to the low-income population, e.g. the Shevardnadze 
government does not develop the economy, that is why there is a large 
number of unemployed people in the country. If we [the opposition] 
come to power we will supply you with new working places, high 
salary and increased pensions. 2) messages stressing the need for 
urgent action, e.g. Shevardnadze is selling the Georgian economy to 
Russia. The reason for this position was that the Russian monopolist 
electricity company, RAO Unified Energy Systems, bought 75% of 
the shares in Georgia's AES Telasi, a subsidiary of the US-based AES 
Cooperation. And also, in May 2003, Georgia and the Russian natural 
gas giant Gazprom conducted negotiations about future cooperation. If 
they reached an agreement, it would mean Gazprom developing the 
Georgian gas pipeline system, and would gain control of gas distri-
bution in Georgia.
xc
 Following these events, George W. Bush sent his 
special envoy for Caspian energy issues to Georgia. The purpose of 
this trip was to warn official Tbilisi "that the proposed gas-sector 
cooperation between Georgia and Gazprom could undermine 
prospects for the exploitation of Azerbaijan's Shah Daniz Caspian gas 
deposit and the export of gas through a pipeline from Baku via Tbilisi 
to Erzerum".
xci
 Simultaneously, the opposition rallied against these 
energy contracts. The underlying message was that "if we come to 
power we will stop it".
xcii 
It was a correct economic tactic used by the 
opposition to attract outside support for their political ambitions. 
The success of the street protests in Georgia was the product of 12 
years of poverty, a vibrant if overeaten political culture, a loud media 
and well-organized demonstrations. In all cases, the Georgian 
opposition stressed the important role of the ordinary citizen, saying 
that they could only become organized, stop the corruption and bring 
changes to the country by relying on and following the opposition 
movement. The most effective way of taking these messages out to the 
people was through the use of the media. The usage of the media by 
the opposition played a serious role in the realization of their political 
ambition. I think the use of the media was the most effective tactic to 
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coordinate, organize and motivate the people as well as to put pressure 
on and control the Shevardnadze government. 
 
Government Tactics 
As the population of Georgia was aware, all the well-known 
opposition leaders had held high-ranking posts during the previous 
regime, and therefore their claims to represent democratic values were 
taken with considerably greater uncertainty domestically. The 
government used this fact as a tactic to diminish the prestige of the 
opposition leaders, by saying that these officials could not handle the 
situation and overcome the challenges of a transition period.
xciii
 
Adelkhanov thinks that these people could not lead the country 
anywhere because "... [Shevardnadze] gave them the chance to prove 
themselves, but they failed...". Meanwhile, it was only Saakashvili 
who did not have any spots on his political career caused by 
corruption. He was also respected by the Zviadists because he was not 
related to the 1992 coup against Zviad Gamsakhurdia. 
The government also had a very effective tactic to challenge the 
citizens' participation in opposition-organized demonstrations. 
According to Alexander Lomia, the Georgian "...people have seen a 
lot of blood during the years that followed the independence. There 
was a very strong form of negative conciliation because, obviously, 
we had a civil war including the wars..." in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Georgia lost thousands of people during these conflicts, 
which made people cautious about violence. This fact was used in 
government propaganda which included statements saying that 
demonstrations were a source of violence and if something happened 
during them, nobody would know who did it. Therefore, it took the 
opposition a while to deliver the message to the public saying that 
mass protest could be peaceful. This tactic let the Shevardnadze 
government win time and stay in power during the political "fight" 
with the opposition. 
Another obvious tactic by the government during the very last days of 
the Shevardnadze government was bringing armed people from Ajaria 
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to Tbilisi, who were known as Aslan Abashidze's supporters. Their 
presence in front of the parliament and other governmental buildings 
with their guns and black leather jackets was mostly a psychological 
tactic by the government in order to threaten, challenge and press 
people and the opposition camp, discouraging them from confronting 
the government bureaucracy. 
 
The Domino Effect 
According to the official reports, on 23 November 2003 the President 
of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze, who had ruled Georgia for 11 years, 
in accordance with his own statement, resigned from his position and 
his term of office ended before the appointed time. The Georgian 
government collapsed simultaneously, and a new presidential election 
was announced for 4 January 2004.
xciv
 It is relevant to know why the 
Shevardnadze government collapsed on Shevardnadze's resignation. 
This domino effect saved the country from civil war or bloodshed. 
What brought the domino effect into action, and which strategies and 
tactics accelerated this process? 
Shevardnadze was left alone, to some extent, during the revolution. 
However, he was not totally abandoned. Small groups of people, such 
as clan members, rich businessmen and high rank officials were with 
him. Ministers and their deputies were very corrupt. High-ranking 
officials were against the revolution but commanders and small unit 
leaders supported the opposition movement. The opposition was 
afraid that corrupted, high-ranking officials might use force against 
them by using criminals and some of their own gangster-groups. 
Therefore, the opposition movement had contacted the power 
ministers on beforehand.
xcv
 The main topic of the negotiations with 
government officials was avoiding violence. "It was impossible to buy 
Shevardnadze's near circle, but we were able to convince some key 
military and police officers to show disobedience and not execute the 
orders of the Shevardnadze government" says a co-founder of the 
Kmara movement.
xcvi
 There were a lot of activities aimed at the 
soldiers and police officers to persuade them that this revolution was 
not against them. Perhaps the revolutionaries did not like their 
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ministers and bosses who were corrupt, but they did not have anything 
personally against them. The main intention was to destroy the 
Shevardnadze government's chain of command, so that: "If they give 
an order, those who have to execute would have a hesitation to do 
it."
xcvii
 By doing this, soldiers and police officers started to consider 
whether they should maintain the regime or not. "Our favourite 
common question at this stage was, 'what is your salary?'". It was too 
small to maintain their family. Police and security forces were 
thinking about their future, i.e. what will happen to me if I use 
force.
xcviii
 On the other hand, Gia Bliadze, a member of the military, 
thinks that there was not any hidden contact with the opposition 
movement. "Maybe during the opposition's meetings with TV and 
press representatives they sent messages to government officials, but 
their messages were open."
xcix 
In a broad context, since the whole nation had been united during the 
November events the army and all other power structures refused to 
use any violence against the people. It was clear to everyone from the 
beginning that the opposition parties had declared their protests and 
demonstrations as being peaceful. They explained that if something 
violent happened from the opposition's side towards the police, 
security forces etc., it would only serve as a provocation. 
The government "fought" till the end but they could not take serious 
measures, e.g. using violence. Bliadze confirms that the army did not 
have any orders to use force against demonstrators. However, he 
confirms that "... when officers got the order to have emergency 
preparation they declared openly that they will not act against people." 
Military officers sent messages to the police, who stood in front of the 
demonstrators, telling them not to use violence against the nation. 
Messages then came back from the police, noting that they would not 
use violence against the people but they would need moral support 
from the Army. As a consequence of these messages, the Ministry of 
State Security and some other Special Forces soldiers and officers 
finally declared they would behave in the same way.
c 
The government collapsed because they were psychologically 
defeated: all government members had lost their credibility in the eyes 
of the people because the opposition leaders were already regarded as 
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the moral 'winners'. The psychological defeat syndrome started just 
after Saakashvili had led the opposition members in storming the 
parliament. Shevardnadze was physically bundled away by his 
bodyguards, soon to be followed by his supporters, leaving the 
parliament building - and soon the whole centre of Tbilisi - in the 
hands of the opposition. It seems this tactic worked perfectly. 
Simultaneously, people started to celebrate the victory over the 
Shevardnadze government. In reality, however, Shevardnadze 
declared his resignation long after the storming of the parliament. The 
tactics of starting to celebrate victory without any legal reason 
destroyed the rest of the chain of command and the legitimacy of the 
Shevardnadze government. The number of people in front of the 
Georgian Parliament suddenly symbolized the will of the Georgian 
nation, and the number of people in the streets ensured that the 
Georgian opposition could realize its long wanted plan without being 
smashed by the government machine. 
Actually, all the above-mentioned strategies and tactics made the 
chain of command fall down like dominoes, not from top to bottom, as 
it was described in the official report (Eduard Shevardnadze resigned 
and his government collapsed simultaneously), but from bottom to 
top. 
These strategies and tactics again confirm that the situation was 
controlled during the November events. I think there is no need to 
argue about which side of the conflict had the most effective strategy 
and tactics. The opposition was the winner and most efficient side 
with their precise strategies and tactics. However, it might be wrong to 
say that Shevardnadze lost completely. As I mentioned above, 
Shevardnadze's strategies and tactics failed from a government 
perspective, but from a personal perspective Shevardnadze did not 
lose much, because according to the last minute negotiations, he 
obtained a security guarantee for himself and his family. From the 
personal perspective, therefore, his strategy and tactics can be viewed 
as successful, at the same time as they can be viewed as a supportive 
feature to the non-violent revolution. 
To summarize, factors that increase a government's ability to remain 
in power (e.g. falsified elections and corruption) may simultaneously 
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reduce the regime's capacity for violence, its electoral strength, or 
simply the unthinking support of the majority. Non-violent action 
appears to be the action people take when they judge that they have a 
particular objective in a "fight", and consider non-violent action to be 
the most effective approach to reach this objective. Some tactics of 
non-violent action were found in cultural traditions, history and the 
economic and social situation rather than just being freely adopted with 
a goal in mind. This shows that there are different reasons for non-
violent action, one of them being the dimension of choice. However, 
there was a set of challenges and supports for the non-violent outcome 
besides the factors mentioned and the chosen strategy and tactics. 
 
Chapter Five 
What challenges and supports were there for the nonviolent 
revolution? 
As I have mentioned in Chapter Three and Four, the Georgian non-
violent revolution was the outcome of many factors, strategy and 
tactics. This chapter will mostly talk about administrative, 
organizational, educative and political direct and indirect challenges 
and supports for the non-violent nature of the revolution. 
It is no accident that the Georgian opposition leaders, most of them 
are lawyers by training, understood the importance of lending 
legitimacy to their actions by working within the guidelines of the 
law. The use of the law by the Georgian opposition forces in chal-
lenging the November election resulted in an insistence on political 
change, which served as a powerful model both within and outside 
Georgia. Internally, the use of legal means to effect change gave the 
Rose Revolution a mandate of legitimacy at home and abroad. 
When the government attempted to assemble the new parliamentary 
session, members of the opposition again cited the law to justify 
entering the chamber - an entry that otherwise might have been 
considered illegal - by accompanying the 65 opposition parliament-
tarians who had just been elected and thus had a legal right to be in the 
legislative chamber. The opposition's efforts to block the assembling 
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of the new parliament was in fact a legal countermove to block any 
attempt by President Shevardnadze to cover fraudulent elections 
results under a veil of legitimacy.
0
' The legitimacy of the opposition's 
actions within the guidelines of the law was the most obvious support 
for the development of events. 
There were also other challenges and supports that played an 
important role in the outcome and character of the revolution. These 
challenges and supports come from different countries, organizations, 
people and from the history in general. One of the biggest challenges 
for Shevardnadze was the imported ideology and model of the 'non-
violent revolution', known as the Serbian Model, which generated a lot 
of support for the opposition. 
 
The Serbian Model 
There were a lot of developments revealing parallels between the 
events that took place in Tbilisi in November 2003 and the coup d'etat 
or revolution that followed the presidential election in Serbia in 2000. 
The Serbian Model is a collection of the ideas where operating 
organizations build a network with the media and are backed by the 
power of people. In Serbia, the Centre for Free Elections and 
Democracy (CeSID) and the Otpor (translated as ‘Resistance’) 
movement in particular were the operating organizations.
cii 
The  ideas 
of these organizations attracted the Georgian opposition and civil 
society in Georgia with their nonviolent strategy and promising 
outcome. The outcome of this mirror effect also brought Georgia the 
exact same model, the National Movement as a CeSID and the Kmara 
movement as an Otpor.
ciii 
The chairman of the Liberty Institute, Levan Ramashvili thinks that 
not only theoretical aspects of the Serbian Model were imported, but 
also many practical techniques, such as h to behave when you are 
arrested and how to organize demonstrations as well as how organize 
a network and to coordinate different episodes. Since this model was 
appro
1 
through the Serbian experience, it made people in Georgia 
confident and played psychological role for both civil society and for 
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opposition parties. According to Courier International (Number 682, 
27 November 2003), a member of Otpor said to the Serbian ra channel 
B92 that "...the Georgian students have been trained by Otpor".
civ
 The 
chairman the Executive Board of the Open Society - Georgian 
Foundation, Micheal Chachkhunash approves the fact that "... the 
young people [of the Kmara movement] had been trainee how to 
organize [meetings], and leaders of the opposition movement went to 
Serbia for the trainings".
cv
 The supporting characteristics of the 
Serbian Model for the Georgian non-violent revolution occurred 
mostly as psychologically and educationally oriented. This model 
helped the opposition camp as well as civil society comprehend what 
kind of resistance and support non-violent revolution could get in the 
modern world. And, the Serbian Model made it с that international 
support, in terms of money, plays an important role during 
organizational process and educational projects. 
 
The Open Society - Georgia Foundation (known as the Soros 
Foundation 
In the Georgian revolution the civil society's role and importance was 
exceptional. Mid Chachkhunashvili said that the aim of the foundation 
during the last 10 years had been to build a civil and open society in 
Georgia. The Open Society - Georgian Foundation especially 
interested in helping organize "...transparent elections which has never 
happened before" in Georgia. Therefore, the foundation funded 
projects whose aim was епсош people to participate in the elections, 
and they sponsored projects such as debates on TV (but not favoring 
any political party).
cvi 
The executive director of the Open Society - Georgian Foundation 
during the revolution, Alexander Lomaia, said "...obviously, the 
revolution was sort of the result of 10 years of Soros work here [in 
Georgia]". He thinks that the Open Society - Georgian Foundation and 
other foundations together managed to create a core of reform-minded 
people in the country. By doing this, they contributed to creating a 





Lomaia also thinks that the foundation created a ground not in terms 
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of revolution, but for maturing the people, making them more 
responsible for their future. This made people "...feel that it depends 
on them to decide their future and the future of the country. In this 
respect, the Soros foundation had some role building up these feelings, 
the self-confidence of the society", Lomaia said. In both cases, 
following these arguments both directly and indirectly, the role of the 
Open Society - Georgian Foundation during the revolution can be 
estimated as supportive to the opposition camp since they also aimed 
at bringing democratic changes to the country. 
During an interview with Thomas de Waal and Margarita Akhvle-
diani, Shevardnadze said that the non-governmental organizations that 
monitored the elections had not been fair. He strongly blamed 
Western governments for giving them financial support. "Maybe it 
was not the intelligence agencies, but some agents [representing 
different countries]" Shevardnadze said. He also said that "...one 
ambassador told me that it [the revolution] had cost him up to $4 
million." On the other hand, Michael Chachkhunashvili claims that the 
entire budget of the 'monitoring of the elections', 'exit polls' and 
'parallel counting of votes' did not exceed half a million US dollars. 
According to Michael Chachkhunashvili, the Open Society-Georgia 
Foundation has never funded anything directly for Kmara. "Kmara as 
an organization does not exist - it has not been registered." Chachkhu-
nashvili said.
cviii
 Meanwhile Levan Ramashvili, the chairman of the 
Liberty Institute, said "the Soros Foundation assisted us in bringing 
people from the Serbian movement [Otpor] here [to Georgia] for one 
week, two or three times. Once. Soros funded our people [5-7 persons] 
to go to Serbia for one week studying". Ramashvili thinks that the 
Kmara members' trip to Serbia was aimed at exchanging experiences 
and gening inspiration from the Otpor movement, who played an 
important role during the toppling of Slobodan Milosevic. These 
above-mentioned details show that the role of the Open Society -
Georgian Foundation in Georgia was supportive for peaceful protest. 
David Darchashvili thinks that the revolution could not have been 
planned by visiting Serbia. "Revolution happens if the government is 
totally deaf of peaceful protests, but nobody at the time of visiting 
Serbia could have predicted how Shevardnadze would behave." The 
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only plan was to learn how to conduct mass rallies, which can lead to 






Richard Miles was appointed as US ambassador to Georgia in 2002. 
He was an ambassador in Baku, Azerbaijan in 1992-3 during Abulfaz 
Elchibay's short-lived presidency that ended in a coup d'etat in June 
1993. He then moved to the Balkans. From 1996-9 he remained the 
United States' charge d'affaires in Belgrade after the official 
diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia had been severed. In 1998 he 
took part in negotiations during the Kosovo crisis.
cx
 
Some sources say that since his appointment as US ambassador to 
Georgia in January 2002, Miles has made no secret of his support for 
the opposition in Georgia. Shevardnadze thinks that there were 
different forces for revolution in Georgia; "...some took part, some 
helped, some made things possible". Concerning the role of the USA 
he said, "I can't speak about the whole country, the whole of America 
playing a role. But I don't think that the administration itself was 
involved in what happened. I don't believe that."
cxi
 Generally, after the 
end of the Cold War, the USA turned to Georgia quite early. Georgia 
was the second largest recipient of US aid per capita (after Israel) 
between 1992 and 2000. Georgia received US$ 778 million of aid, 
roughly five times the amount of neighboring Azerbaijan during this 
years.
cxii 
The role of the USA and its ambassador during the revolution is very 
debatable. As I have mentioned in Chapter four, the USA was 
interested in having democratic elections in Georgia, as well as 
securing the transportation of the hydrogen recourses of the Caspian 
Sea via Georgia. Therefore, there were strong diplomatic pressures on 
the Shevardnadze government regarding these issues. Ingrid Degraeve 
argues that the US ambassador was very active, and he was always at 
places where decisions were taken. His presence and advice during the 
negotiations between Shevardnadze and Zhvania, Burjanadze and 
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Saakashvili put heavy diplomatic pressures on them. In this respect, 
the role of the USA during the eve of the revolution was quite 
supportive to the revolution. "You know, in the West they support 
realistic forces," Shevardnadze said. "They were convinced that those 
people were coming to power. Yes, there was Shevardnadze, he was a 
good man, they could work with him. But he only had a year or two 
left and he had to go. And then, whom could they deal with? So they 
started looking. And they found these three people and maybe some 






The Kmara movement emerged on 14 April 2003, when about 200 
students marched from Tbilisi State University to the State Chancel-
lery,
cxiv
 chanting their slogan "Kmara" and waiving the flags of the 
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic with the faces of the current 
government leaders on them. Before this event, the Kmara group was 
known under different names
cxv
 Kmara followed the model developed 
by the Otpor student movement in the Federal Republic of Yugos-
lavia, which was later reprised by the Pora Movement in Ukraine. 
This involved active exchange of expertise in methods of non-violent 
protest, e.g. some Kmara activists had been taken to Serbia to meet 
Otpor members or the trip of Otpor activists to Tbilisi in 2003. The 
Otpor activists ran three-day classes teaching more than 1,000 
Georgian students about mobilization and how to stage a nonviolent 
protest.
cxvi 
Ramishvili said that Kmara emerged from the student protest groups 
who were initially against corruption in the universities. Later on, 
when it became clear that it was impossible to change anything within 
the universities unless you changed the whole political system, Kmara 
started to mobilize the citizens to participate actively in public life. 
Kmara gradually became an organizing movement taking part in 
different demonstrations primarily with young people as their target 
groups. 
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Talking about the origins of the revolution, Ramashvili thinks 
everything started much earlier. "We were preparing the ground for a 
long period of time". When the Shevardnadze government lost its 
legitimacy among a majority of the citizens, the emergence of a civil 
society in Georgia was made possible. When the leader is famous 
among a majority of the citizens, the civil society's call for 
democratization and development sounds less convincing. Therefore, 
there was not much room for the civil society to emerge during the 
Gamsakhurdia period. He was very popular among citizens, although 
the political system was weak and the citizens were not engaged in 
public life. Neither was there was not any donor organizations at that 
time for the civil society. Later, the military defeat in Abkhazia during 
the Shevardnadze period caused the idea of a united Georgia to 
collapse. "When you are defeated you became more critical, therefore, 
these critical minds opened [up for] sort of democratic reforms in 
Georgia" said Ramashvili. Shevardnadze was forced to take into more 
serious consideration issues like the role of law, democracy building 
etc. because it was time to get foreign aid too for Georgia.
cxvii 
Kmara activists went to the districts and had a lot of talks with people. 
Kmara tried to explain to the people that if you want to get rid of this 
government, solve all these problems and live better then you should 
come to the election stations to vote. "We organized humour shows in 
order to get popularity... we wanted [to present] something visually 
and organizationally nice to people by showing that we want truth, 
nothing but truth". During these shows Shevardnadze used to be a 
small toy personage or character, discrediting and dissolving his 
prestige. There was a real need to bring creative approaches and style 
to the political life of Georgia. Another such creative action was to 
make all cars honk their horn while Shevardnadze was sitting in a 
radio interview, making the whole city shake. Ingrid Degraeve 
approves of the fact that "people like actions which gives power and 
suits perfectly to the character of Georgians".
cxviii 
During the November 2003 events, Kmara was one of the two 
organizers of the demonstrations. The other, and strongest one, was 
the National Movement. Kmara's role was mostly organizational.
cxxvi
 
For example, there were some buildings surrounded by buses (used as 
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barriers) and government forces. Kmara put some people there in 
order to not let people go in the direction of these buildings in order to 
avoid any provocation. Akaki Minashvili says: "We were like 
militants [with our] about 5000 Kmara people with whom we had 
contact" among the around 100.000 demonstrators. There were a lot of 
people wearing Kmara t-shirts and imitating them. They could not 
know all of them. Therefore, "we tried to have a decentralized 
system", e.g. there were 2-3 known Kmara activist supervising 
subgroups and these subgroups were also divided into subgroups. 
However, all these levels were responsible to the same objective. 
Levan Ramishvili thinks that the success of the Georgian revolution 
comes from self-confidence and good organization of the citizens. 
Five years ago there had also been corruption, poverty and all other 
kinds of problems in Georgia, but that time they had failed to organize 
themselves. When there was an attempt by the government to shut 
down the independent Rustavi-2 TV-channel, people went out to the 
streets to protest against the government's behaviour. The protests, in 
which youth took an active part, culminated in the resignation of the 
government and the chairman of the parliament. "Because the Kmara 
group was not organized, and there was not a nation-wide network, we 
could not finish the revolution" said Ramashvili. He thinks that if 
somebody wants revolution, this person needs, as Lenin said, organi-
zation, organization and organization".
cxxvii
 
The role of the Kmara student movement during the Georgian 
revolution supported the nonviolent outcome. As I have discussed 
during this subchapter, Kmara mostly filled the role as organizers of 
the protests, and, using their own words, they were "the militants of 
the demonstrations". Their role was very challenging to the 
government, and thus Kmara was one of the most important players 
during the Georgian non-violent revolution. 
Most of the people of Georgia felt excluded from the democratic 
processes, because they believed that political parties are located 
exclusively in the centre of the country, and the regions are only 
remembered shortly before elections when their votes are needed. 
People did not like the government. Although they were critical of the 
situation, most of them were cynical about public life and politics. 
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Nobody was trying to change the country, or to come out and tell them 
to go away.
cxix
 It was because people were afraid of bloodshed. In this 
situation, Kmara offered people the chance to follow them. "We also 
wanted to make people believe that all these changes will occur non-
violently" said Kmara movement activists.
cxx 
Kmara had applied the philosophy of non-violence to the Georgian 
revolution. "We worked very hard in order to make it non-violent", 
says a Kmara activist. "Georgians turned out to be good students [of 
non-violent methods], however, we must make sure that demon-
strators would not throw stones at the police". A part of the Kmara 
activists' training was that they had to count on the police. Even if the 
police was violent and aggressive, they had to hide their discontent. 
"We should always appeal to the police and show cooperation". It was 
strictly prohibited for Kmara activists to respond to the police even if 
they were beaten.
cxxi 
"To be very non-violent and very peaceful was 
one of our main concerns in order to encourage citizens to take part to 
the demonstrations" Ramashvili said. He also thinks that before 
Kmara's engagement, people had a perception that demonstrations 
mean instability. Therefore, "with small demonstrations, underlining 
the non-violence, we tried to convince citizens that it would not be 
war. If people are active, this means we will achieve what we are 
trying to get. There will be no destabilization or violence".
cxxii 
The most visible tactics of the Kmara movement before and after the 2 
November elections were bringing people outside and motivating 
them to participate in political life. It was a set of tactics that promised 
people non-violent changes, discipline and commitment. According to 
Levan Ramishvili, Kmara's biggest challenge to the government was 
the tactic of engaging the rural population in politics. "In the city we 
were in a dead-end. People were on our side, but the power structures 
were [strong] enough to counterbalance", said Ramashvili. The way 
out of this dead-end was to bring new players onto the political stage, 
and that was the people who had not played a previous role in politics; 
the citizens of the countryside. Kmara had a bigger network and more 
activists in the countryside than in the capital. "When we came out 
with several thousand people, we transported many groups of people 
from the districts and organized everything for them", a Kmara 
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activist says. A primary goal was to not let the police and militants 
occupy the demonstration field.
cxxiii
 Therefore, there were Kmara 
activists staying at the demonstration field day and night. Besides 
these young people, not a lot of people wanted to stay outside. 
However, when people saw Kmara activists staying day and night in 
the demonstration field in order to express their dissatisfaction regar-
ding the work of the government; it motivated a lot of other citizens. 
People did not like the political parties in Georgia, and some did not 
trust their members. However, Kmara always distanced themselves 
from the opposition parties. They stated clearly that "we are not a 
[political] party, and our goal is not to participate in the govern-
ment".
cxxiv
 This was a completely new message for Georgian ears. 
"We are fighting and struggling for certain ideas", said Georgi Kande-
laki. "We invited people to the elections, but whom they would vote 
for depended on them". Kmara always tried to differentiate itself from 
the rest of the political opposition. "We organized joint demonst-
rations but we still had different objectives" Kandelaki argued. To 
change the Shevardnadze government and to come to power was the 
dream of almost every political party, at least for those who had joined 
the demonstrations; meanwhile, Kmara's objective was to reform the 




The Autonomous Republic of Ajaria, on the southern Black Sea coast, 
was almost out of Tbilisi's administrative control during the last years 
of Shevardnadze's leadership. Shevardnadze's efforts to bring the 
Ajarian regime led by Asian Abashidze under control failed. 
Abashidze had routinely obtained more than 90 percent of the votes in 
every election he had faced since coming to power in 1991. In 2002, 
his 24-year-old son, George, became mayor of Batumi, the regional 
capital, receiving 94 percent of the votes. Some analysts have also 
suggested that MOSCOW entertained the hope of having Abashidze 
succeed Shevardnadze, either mid-term or after the end of 
Shevardnadze's term in 2005. Some even talked about engineering 
such a succession as a condition for Moscow's support for Shevard-
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nadze. Interestingly, Shevardnadze's old foe Asian Abashidze became 
his last ally during the failed 2003 election. Shevardnadze found 
support in Abashidze's Union of Democratic Revival party, which was 
a formal opposition party, but which became Shevardnadze's 
supporter during the revolutionary days (the regime was also 
supported by Industry Will Save Georgia).
cxxviii 
Interestingly, Asian Abashidze became the most challenging figure for 
the opposition and for the Georgian revolution during the November 
events. Abashidze sent a group of armed people from Ajaria to Tbilisi 
to protect the Shevardnadze government. He knew that the fall of 
Shevardnadze would lead to his own fall in the long run. Nino 
Makhashvili thinks that "the gunmen from Adjaria were not 
competitive, because they knew that although they are here [in Tbilisi] 
for supporting Shevardnadze, in reality Abashidze does not like him 
[Shevardnadze]" Therefore, they were less motivated to use weapons 
to support Shevardnadze. Gia Bliadze thinks that 70-80% of the 
Abashidze people standing in front of the demonstrators were 
Adjarian police and Special Forces wearing civilian clothes. "They 
were ready to use weapons, but when they saw the big mass they 
knew that they cannot leave without casualty if they use weapons" 
thinks Bliadze. According to Tea Tukharidze, the number of people 
coming to protect Shevardnadze was around 6-8000. After the 
opposition stormed the parliament, some of these armed people ran 
away while others simply stayed there, but this time as demonstrators, 
and not as defenders of Abashidze's interests. The unexpected support 
of Abashidze and gunmen from Ajaria represented a psychological as 
well as a tactical challenge for the non-violent revolution. During the 
interviews, people expressed their concern that people from Ajaria 
easily might have used weapons against demonstrators during the 
November elections. 
 
Trust and Credibility 
It is hardly surprising that the conventional association of revolutions 
with violence was also considered in pre-revolutionary Georgia. Since 
the civil war and the later prosecution of Zivadists had political 
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reasons (i.e. obtaining power), it made ordinary people afraid of 
engaging themselves in anything believed to be against the will of the 
government. Another argument for the mistrust was that the 
opposition in the country was spread and divided. Even two months 
before the November parliamentary election, the leader of the 
opposition National Movement party, Mikheil Saakashvili, cast doubt 
over the opposition stance of the leader of the United Democrats, 
Zurab Zvania, considering him to be in alliance with President 
Shevardnadze. "If the President calls Zhvania tomorrow, he will run 
without hesitation and stand with him. This is the conclusion I have 
made as a result of [my] relations with him," Saakashvili said on 8 
September 2003.
cxxix
 But two months after this accusation these two 
parties organized their demonstrations and rallies together and united. 
This kind of uncertainly and this kind of political parties made it 
difficult for ordinary people to build their confidence. Therefore, it 
was very challenging to convince people that there was not going to 
be violence if they also took part in the opposition-organized 
demonstrations. 
It is appropriate to mention that there were several violent conflicts 
between the supporters of the pro-government alliance and the 
members of the National Movement before the parliamentary election. 
This also created a psychological barrier for the people to take further 
part in political activities. The leader of the National Movement party 
Mikheil Saakashvili accused the supporters of the pro-governmental 
parties of organizing a provocation against their rally. Saakashvili said 
that his party had planned to hold a peaceful rally only.
cxxx
 Thus, 
history proves that peacefully planned rallies have had violent ends in 
Georgia before. Therefore, in the beginning people were cautious 
about taking part in the rallies to demand the real results of the 
election after 2 November 2003. 
 
Eduard Shevardnadze's Fall from Grace 
The general opinion about Shevardnadze's fall from grace is debatable 
and sometimes contradicting. The main reason why people became 
very radically involved against Shevardnadze is that the Shevardnadze 
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government was too far from reality. The last years of Shevardnadze's 
presidency had nothing to do with real life
cxxxi
 and had nothing to do 
with the needs of the population.
cxxxii
 The revolution was a logical 
continuation of the degradation of society. However, Shevardnadze 
was trying to give the impression that Georgia had some democratic 
institutions, e.g. a parliament with some young reformers, adapted 
reformist laws and even a campaign against corruption. Basically, 
Shevardnadze thought that he controlled everything with his power, 
but the reality was different. Without his will, he let "the genie out of 
the bottle, and it was impossible to get it back".
cxxxiii
 
Meanwhile, pro-democracy groups within the government were 
looking for allies in order to consolidate their power in the future. 
Their natural allies became the free media and the NGOs.
cxxxiv
 
Therefore, these pro-democratic groups made the parliament very 
transparent and open, as they were inviting NGOs to attend committee 
hearings, to make their testimony, and to argue for adoption of some 
laws. For example, the Liberty Institute carried out investigative 
journalism. As a result of these investigations, several ministers of the 
Shevardnadze government were forced to resign, e.g. the ministers of 
communication, finance and agriculture, and two ministers of energy. 
This successful experience started to be replicated by other people and 
NGOs against different governmental institutions and bureaucracy. 
The step-by-step development of civil society simultaneously 
weakened Shevardnadze's government. 
The later years of Shevardnadze's presidency increasingly demonstra-
ted signs of democratic erosion. This led to rising tensions, expressed 
in the form of an increasing polarization in Georgian politics between 
the broad coalition of Saakashvili, Zhvania and Burjanadze, and those 
who were challenged them.
cxxxv
 For example, Saakashvili resigned 
from the post of Minister of Justice in 2001 after claiming that the 
government would not support him in the fight against corruption. 
Meanwhile, the international community began to distance itself from 
Shevardnadze and his regime, starting from 2000. All government 
projects were failing, and the world started to call Georgia a failed 
state.
cxxxvi
 When the OSCE harshly criticized the conduct of the 
presidential elections in 2000, it was the first time that this organi-
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zation had denounced a Georgian poll. Later, in 2003, James Baker 
sent a clear message to Shevardnadze by stressing that the elections 
should be fair, in order to allow young people, who had distanced 
themselves from the government, to enter government posts. 
The Shevardnadze government had always been based on a balance of 
power between different groups. Shevardnadze tried to keep the 
balance between different people inside the country.
cxxxvii 
He did not 
have a coherent political view. Therefore, the struggle between groups 
started to become intense during 1992-97. Shevardnadze behaved like 
a father and had influence on the competing groups. These groups 
were mainly representatives of the corrupt, and of the young 
generation of people who wanted to get into the government through 
parliament. These competing groups used the strategy of blaming each 
other of disturbing Shevardnadze's work. However, Shevardnadze 
chose to work with the corrupted group.
cxxxviii 
Therefore, Saakashvili 
later resigned from his post of Minster of Justice, citing that he 
believed it was immoral to remain part of the corrupt government. 
After Saakashvilli's resignation, several high-ranking officials from 
the Shevardnadze government followed his example. So in that way, 
Shevardnadze stayed alone among these corrupt officials and he lost 
his own prestige and charisma. 
In the beginning, the figure of Shevardnadze was very strong. He had 
ruled Georgia for 30 years, first as a leader of the Georgian 
Communist Party during the Soviet era, and then as head of state in 
the independent Georgia. He was an unreachable and remote person 
for Georgians, because he had held high posts in Moscow during the 
Soviet time, and had always been far from people. That is why people 
respected him. Shevardnadze had a kind of myth around himself and 
he was the dominant figure in Georgia. Meanwhile, civil society was 
thinking about how to destroy this myth around Shevardnadze. The 
Liberty Institute came up with the idea of political cartoons. Shevar-
dnadze was a little cartoon character in these cartoon shows. When 
they showed this cartoon on Rustavi 2 it sent shock waves through 
society.
cxxxix
 It can be argued that as a result of these cartoons, people 
started to devalue the prestige of Shevardnadze. In fact, the chairman 
of the Liberty Institute, Levan Ramashvili (the owner of the cartoon 
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idea) thinks that there was a bit of creativity in the cartoon idea, but it 
was eventually Shevardnadze himself who discredited and dissolved 
his prestige. "He was promising the citizens to bring law and order, 
end corruption, to crack down organized crime and trafficking. He 
promised everything", said Ramashvili. Meanwhile, in the opposetion 
camp, another figure was growing - Mikheil Saakashvili, who had 
won the "man of the year" reward introduced by the civil society in 
1996.
cxl
 Shevardnadze's fall from grace was already underway. 
Based on the above-mentioned facts, it can be argued that Shevard-
nadze's fall from grace was not completely unexpected, and his 
weakening position was of major support to the Georgian revolution. 
 
The Danger of Civil War 
The greatest challenge to the concept of revolution in Georgia was the 
threat of civil war. According to Anke Hoeffler and Paul Collier, if a 
country has recently had a civil war,
cxli
 its risk of further war is much 
higher. Immediately after the end of hostility, there is a 40% chance of 
further conflict, but this risk falls with around one percent for each 
year of peace.
cx1ii 
If we follow this logic, a simple calculation will 
show (2003-1992=11; 40-11=29) that there was a 29% chance of 
having a civil war in Georgia in 2003. However, there was a major 
difference between the period of Zviad Gamsakhurdia at the 
beginning of the 1990's, and the end of Shevardnadze's period about 
ten years later. If we look at one example from Georgia's recent past 
we see that during the period of Gamsakhurdia the people of 
Georgia were divided into two parts: people supporting Gamsakhurdia 
and people opposing him. But during the 2003 revolution, people were 
divided between Shevardnadze and his corrupt team and their families 
on one side, and the whole nation on the other. Therefore, 
Shevardnadze and his team did not dare to shed blood because almost 
nobody supported them and were with them. However, there was a 
danger that some people from the police and army or from those sent 
to Tbilisi by Abashidze, would blindly follow a hypothetical order to 
shoot at the demonstrators. 
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Generally, people possess a lot of weapons in Georgia. Arms are 
spread all over the country. According to the information form the 
Minister of Defence, around 15,000 light weapons were lost by the 
army units during the turbulent period in Georgia.
cxliii
 The Director of 
the Strategic Research Institute, Natela Sakhokia, argues that people 
may have had weapons with them at the demonstrations, though they 
did not openly show them. Meanwhile, Michael Chachkhunashvili 
assumes that there were no weapons in the hands of the people during 
the revolution day. Otherwise, we would have seen or heard them.
cxliv
 
In all the mentioned cases, there was a danger of civil war, which 
directly and indirectly challenged the revolution. Actually, the 
possible danger of civil war in a way also supported the non-violent 
revolution, namely because this increased the opposition's efforts in 
choosing a strict, non-violent character. 
 
Symbols and Superstitions 
The rose appeared. Throughout the revolution, the rose was the 
symbol of protest. On 22 November in particular there were a lot of 
roses in the hands of protesters. The rose became a symbol of peace 
and friendship. At one point, people even started to give roses to the 
soldiers in order to show their peaceful intention to those who were 
standing face-to-face with them. 
The rose was also present when Saakashvili and his fellows stormed 
into the Parliament's plenary room while Shevardnadze was giving his 
blessing speech to the new "elected" Parliament Members. Shevardna-
dze's people met a bunch of opposition members at the doorstep. First 
of all, they were all men. They were enemies (or at least their 
ideologies were enemy). Ingrid Degraeve describes the tense situation: 
"They were so close to each other. Their bodies were touching each 
other, but they were not fighting or beating. It was like touching, but 
only by using the power of the bodies pressing against each other. It 
was a very strange situation."
cxlv 
During this confrontation, Shevardnadze's bodyguards took him away. 
Shevardnadze was pale and looking sick. He was yelling on his way 
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out of the parliament that he would not resign, that he would be in 
power until his presidency period expired. Meanwhile, Saakashvili 
stepped ahead and mounted the rostrum. He took Shevadnadze's 
unfinished tea, drank it completely and put the glass back in its place 
with power. He actually touches the glass that Shevardnadze drunk 
from. This action becomes a symbol of the opposition's victory, 
because in Georgian culture, drinking something bottoms up signifies 
power and braveness. To draw another analogy, it is like knocking 
over your opponent's king during a game of chess, when he himself 
does not want to admit that he lost the game. All of a sudden, a 
Georgian national folk song started to play outside the parliament. 
This song, in its figurative meaning, acted as a sign of victory for the 
opposition.
cxlvi 
"Georgians are superstitious", said Nino Makhashvili. The revolution 
occurred on the day of Saint George. Georgians respect this saint more 
than other saints, and this is why Georgia is also named after this 
saint. Saint George's Day is a very big holiday in Georgia.
cxlvii
 A local 
revolution
cxlviii 
to remove Asian Abshidze in Ajaria on 6 April 2004 
also occurred on Saint George's Day five months after the Rose 
Revolution.
cxlix
 Was it a coincidence? According to the beliefs of some 
Georgians, it was certainly not a coincidence. Georgians say that "the 
sky and the sun are talking with us during the day of George. So if 
they talk to you then you can ask help from them." This is exactly 
what, according to Nino Makhashvili, the Georgian opposition said to 
the people during the eve of the Rose Revolution.
cl
 
When Saint George's Day arrived, the opposition camp started to cam-
paign that they would win today because truth is on their side. This 
served as a mythical and religious support for the opposition. The 
religious factor probably also played a big role in the decision of the 
government to get the new "elected" parliament approved on 23 
November. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the church became more and 
more important in Georgia. However, the role of the church during the 
revolution did not appear to be very significant. On the day of the 
storming, at the very beginning people went out, carrying crosses to 
the soldiers meaning that we are praying, please do not shoot. This 
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was the only really strong religious act during that time. However, the 
Georgian religious leader did not come to bless the new, "elected" 
parliament on 23 November, and this was of great moral support to 
the people. 
According to Ingrid Degraeve, the eve of the revolution was a really 
magical time. People were walking around the parliament building to 
create good energy. "It is a dervish", she said. She seemed to be of the 
opinion that there was a lot of influence from the West, but that the 
revolution also contained very eastern-oriented elements. Power, 
touching, poetry and peoples' singing and dancing were the romantic 
part of the revolution. All these symbols and superstitions played a 
supportive role to the organizers of the non-violent revolution, and 
they played a role in defining its character and time. 
 
The Media 
The Media is considered one of the other main factors that played a 
role in the realisation of the revolution and the formulation of its 
character. In a broad context, some creative interviewees described the 
Georgian Rose Revolution as an outcome of digital supports and 
challenges in the modern world. In an international context, the 
revolution received tremendous support from the world's leading 
broadcasting companies, above all CNN. The events in Georgia 
during 22-23 November were broadcast almost 24 hours on CNN. The 
government could not afford to be violent, because the whole world 
was looking at Georgia. The fact that the revolution was on CNN all 
the time, represented in itself a tremendous pressure and support to 
both the government and the opposition.
cli
 
In a local context, there was high competition between the local TV 
channels to cover the events from the streets. The TV channels needed 
to criticize the government in order to become a famous channel.
clii 
That is why some of the TV channels that were not pro-opposition at 
the beginning, in the end had shifted their support in order to meet the 
demand of the audience. As I have already mentioned, the Open 
Society - Georgia Foundation funded some projects on TV, such as 
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political TV debates. The TV debates became especially popular 
among the citizens. The Shevardnadze government gave relative 
freedom to the mass media and press in the country. Natela Sakhokia 
thinks that Shevardnadze did not take the mass media seriously. They 
gave the mass media the chance to say what they wanted to say 
because "they thought that at the end they would control the 
government as they want". But this did not happen. In fact, only TV 
controlled the whole mass of people outside. The media, namely TV, 
told people to go here or there. "Even those people who were standing 
in the square or streets did not know where to go. We followed the TV 
channels," said Natela Sakhokia. The Rustavili 2 TV-channel with its 
broad audience was working for the opposition. Nana Kakabadze said 
"...the opposition had paid a big amount of money to the mass media. 
Newspapers and journals were bought by them as well".
cliii
 
Rustavi 2 TV has been broadcasting in Georgia since 1996. It is an 
efficient, professional company compared to the old-fashioned, boring 
Georgian state TV. Rustavi 2 had been the major mouthpiece for the 
Saakashvili opposition for the past 3 years. Rustavi 2 TV was a key 
ingredient in the campaign - as Radio B92 had been in Serbia. Just as 
B92 did, Rustavi 2 gave airtime to the Kmara youth group, who urged 
people to go out to vote. 
After the 2 November parliamentary elections, the opposition parties 
only organized demonstrations on Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays. At 
the beginning, these demonstrations aimed at sending a message to the 
government saying that the people of Georgia are not going to tolerate 
any intention that might violate the real election results. People were 
called to these meetings by Rustavi 2 TV and the 'Mcvane Talga' 
('Green Wave') Radio channel. During this stage of the events, the 
media was the only power pressuring the government. Ingrid 
Degraeve thinks that many people had learnt a lot about how to adjust 
themselves to a new position and strategy of non-violent protest 
during the last 20 days before the revolution. "Everything was 
constructive and peaceful", thinks Ingrid Degraeve. A documentary on 
the mass protests that brought Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic 
from power in September 2000 and movies devoted to Mahatma 
Ghandi's tactics of non-violent protests was aired several times before 
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22 November by Rustavi-2. The aim of these movies was to teach 
people about the possibility of conducting revolution without 
violence. They were motivating films in order to get people outside
cliv
. 
"Most important was the film," the General Secretary of the National 
Movement, Ivane Merabishvili, told reporters on 25 November. He 
added that "all the demonstrators knew the tactics of the revolution in 
Belgrade by heart because [Rustavi-2] showed...the film on their 




At the beginning, TV channels were in the middle by maintaining the 
balance. They always commented on both sides, but by the end 
everything was clear. "You simply needed to take position, either here 
or there", Minashvili thinks. "Around ten days ago [approximately 
starting from 8 November], Rustavi 2 took the opposition side".
clvi
 
Nino Makhashvili confirms that Saakashvili perhaps every day had a 
direct speech on TV to the people of Georgia. "He had been saying 
very shocking and clear things against the government. 
Everybody understood his language. When Sheveranadze was talking, 
you really needed to interpret several things, because you could not 
understand, but with Saakashvili, he presented clear and understand-
dable ideas. People were discussing all his ideas at home and with 
colleagues. He always told police and soldiers "we are your brothers, 
sisters and your blood. You cannot kill us. It is true that soldiers are 
hungry and have a lot of problems. They also do not want this govern-
ment anymore". All this shows that the media were supportive to the 
Georgian revolution in formulating its nature, and they challenged the 
government by making any provocations or use of violence difficult. 
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Conclusion 
What made the Georgian Revolution non-violent? 
"...I do not believe that any man can dress in civilian clothes who 




All the discussions in the previous chapters show that there were 
many factors, strategies, challenges and supports contributing to the 
nonviolent outcome during the November events. As we have seen, 
the answer to the question 'what made the Georgian revolution 
nonviolent?', does not lie in one unique fact or reason. However, the 
general answer to this question might be that the Georgian Rose 
Revolution was nonviolent because it was a coup from inside as well 
as a revolution from outside. 
In reality, the need to bring changes to the country did not necessarily 
define the character of the events. Thus, there were several reasons 
why the Georgian revolution could have been violent as opposed to 
non-violent. These reasons could not guarantee absolutely whether a 
non-violent or violent revolution would break out, because one group's 
nonviolent action does not cancel out the other's violence or vice 
versa. Nonviolent action is likely to be chosen by only one party in a 
conflict. Empirical data show that both the government and the 
opposition were expecting violence. According to Dr Marina 
Muskhelishvili "...when Saakashvili seized the parliamentary building, 
he and his surrenders all had bullet proof jackets." Interestingly, the 
co-founder of Kmara movement, Akaki Minashvili, also argued that 
"they [the bodyguards] had their guns ready..." when the opposition 
activists stormed the parliament. These arguments support the idea 
that violence was expected. 
 
1) Theoretical explanations for the non-violent outcome 
According to Thomas Weber, nonviolent action is often deliberately 
met with violence (or by legal or political suppression).
clviii
 In spite of 
all the mentioned factors, strategies and tactics, there was a great risk 
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that there would be violence in Georgia. Even though most attention 
in this thesis has been given to the organizational, educational and 
management work of the opposition movement, in reality it is a fact 
that no organizer can control every individual inside a mass of people 
unless every individual understands that he or she plays a creative role 
and a symbolic part for the outcome during the public actions.
clix 
A working democratic constitution is not only a legal textbook, but 
also a legal 'norm of action' - not just a Maw in the book' but rather a 
'law in practice'. Therefore, a strong public relies on a public sphere 
framed by the norms of a constitution. Meanwhile, a weak public is 
characterized by 'communicative power', but lacks 'administrative 
power'. Or, a weak public has more influence, but no legally regulated 
access to practical or administrative power. However, the 
communicative power of a weak public can have a profound political 
impact and can lead to political reforms (for example in the Moldovan 
case) and even to revolutions like in the post-Soviet countries, 
Georgia and Ukraine. Pre-revolutionary Georgia also had a weak 
public. It was a public sphere where the existence of basic rights was 
established by soft or hard laws. In reality such rights were necessary, 
but not sufficient for the emergence of such a public. Therefore, in the 
case of a weak public, relations between different public spheres and 
political legislation, administrative implementation, juridical 
application and law enforcement are neither ruled by norms of 
(sufficient and effective) democratic self-organization, nor granted 
(sufficient and effective) democratic access to the legal system.
clx 
As far as Gatung's conflict triangle theory is concerned, we can see 
that here again the attitude, behaviour and situation were determinedly 
non-violent by the people. Their attitude was to bring democratic 
changes to the country, while their behaviour was to show civic 
cautiousness against any attempt of violence; to be non-violent. 
Therefore, they had the most direct influence on the situation in the 
field than any other external factors. Gandhi argues that in order for 
civil disobedience to be effective "the issue must be defined and 
capable of being clearly understood within the power of the 
opponent's effort". In this respect, the people's demands were 
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understood correctly by some Shevardnadze officials who took their 
side at the end. 
The uniqueness of the Georgian Rose revolution is that it started as a 
protest against a falsification of the parliamentary election, but ended 
with revolution, making it an electoral revolution. The use of the law 
by the Georgian opposition forced November election results to be 
challenged and resulted in an insistance on political change, which 
served as a powerful model both within and outside of Georgia. The 
use of legal means to effect change gave the Rose Revolution a 
mandate of legitimacy at home and abroad. Having the legal basis as 
well as the eagerness of people to protect their votes made this protest 
different from many other protests and demonstrations held by the 
opposition in the past against the Shevardnadze leadership. It is also 
worth stressing that the opposition's non-violent declared protests 
turned out to be non-violent in reality as well. This fact itself made the 
police friendly and socially interactive towards people during these 
protests. Starting from 2 November, the police and other power 
structures were present in the field in order to supply public security 
for the protestors. Small scale rallies and protests at the beginning did 
not give the impression that their political activity would lead to the 
resignation of the president, the Rose Revolution. At this level, rallies 
and protests were very small and easy to break up; at the same time, 
the police and officials from other power structures were also much 
more loyal at the beginning and would hypothetically have 
implemented any kind of order from the government, though this was 
not the case by the end. 
According to David Darchashvili, one of the potential dangers was 
that there were "...many bloodthirsty people on the streets during the 
revolution."
clxi
 Gandhi admits that the need to remain non-violent and 
truthful becomes more difficult "because the emphasis in group action 
tends to shift from inner purity to external conformity, and this tells on 
the potency of soul-force."
clxii
 But an ordinary participant in the 
demonstrations, Georgi Shubutidze, said: "I was standing at the 
demonstration with a bunch of my friends, but I did not have anything 
in my mind like to burn automobiles or fight. We were very happy 
because we were doing something good that day". Accordingly, this 
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relaxing atmosphere did not allow the hooligans and bloodthirsty 
people to use the opportunity to mess around. In other words, 
according to Gandhi's theory, civil disobedience was not a state of 
lawlessness, but presupposes a law-abiding spirit, combined with self-
restrain.
clxiii 
To summarize, the situation encouraged people to follow the 
organizers and opposition leaders during the demonstrations, rather 
than make their own decisions and initiatives according to the 
changeable environment. In other words, theoretically, the situation 
did not change people's attitude and behaviour. Therefore, the 
situation did not have a strong impact on changing the declared non-
violent nature of the events. Nino Makhashvili thinks that the 
Georgian nation showed that they had more resources than one can 
imagine during the November events. "For many people in Georgia, 
the revolution was a survival from the crisis, stopping awful processes 
in the society" Makhashvili said. Therefore, people looked at these 
protests as a starting point for integrity and unity in the society or 
country. It was in peoples' interest to keep things under control. 
Gene Sharp in his book, the Dynamics of Non-violent Action, argues 
that the course of a struggle may take any of a wide variety of forms 
depending on the strategies and tactics and methods chosen to meet 
the particular needs of the situation. In contrast, the situation concept 
of Galtung's Conflict Triangle theory proves here that peoples' 
'attitude' and 'behaviour' was less dependent on the real situation in the 
field. People were supporting non-violent and civic forms of changes 
and therefore they had a stable attitude and behaviour regardless of 
any new situation appearing. 
Another important theoretical answer to the question why the 
Georgian revolution was nonviolent is that, as Gandhi argues, no 
matter what legislation is passed over peoples' head, if that legislation 
is in conflict with people' ideas of right and wrong then people say 
that they shall not submit to the legislation. Thomas Weber thinks 
"where the state is corrupted, repressive or dominated by an 
imperialist power the "citizen" may "revolt", that is, break laws even 
for symbolic purposes in order to bring down the system."
clxiv
 In the 
Georgian case, the opposition movement referred to the civil 
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disobedience strategy. It aimed to force the government and public 
into making a choice.  
2) The use of violence would lead to loss of economic and political 
support and therefon make it impossible to 'win' the conflict. 
It is believed that both the government and opposition in Georgia were 
very much afraid of bloodshed. The opposition camp and the 
government knew that whichever side started to use violence first, 
would lose its support. According to the exchange theory of power, a 
political actor has power because it has resources.
clxv
 In general, power 
can be divided into two: 1) the power to command, order, enforce - 
coercive or 'hard' power. This kind of power has always been 
important in violent conflict. 2) The power to induce cooperation, to 
legitimize, to inspire - persuasive or 'soft' power. And, this kind of 
power may be important in conflicts bui must be managed 
peacefully.
clxvi
 Therefore, using violence during the November events 
would mean that political actor (either from the government or from 
the opposition) has chosen hard power. In the Georgian case, choosing 
hard power would raise awareness of the conflict (e.g. how 
undemocratic it is and how it violates Human Rights) among those 
who are external or internal supporters of the top dog. The resources 
available for the political actors from the external and internal 
supporters were mostly economical and political. These supporters 
would refuse to support the top dog (the violent one) anymore because 
using hare power cannot easily be justified, and without economic and 
political support the top dog would start to weaken gradually and 
collapse. 
In addition to the strong international observation and commitment, 
the live broadcasting of the events on the streets by the leading world 
mass media put pressure and responsibility on the sides not to use 
violence. Due to the high press coverage of the events, the use of 
violence would definitely have been a victory for the other side. 
According to the news release issued by the United States Embassy to 
Georgia on September 29, parties across the political spectrum agreed 
to support a Scorecard for Georgian Elections advanced by former 
Secretary of State James Baker during his July 5-6 visit to Tbilisi, 
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which says "all political actors will refrain from violence, or 
incitement to violence, threats and intimidation during the election 
campaign, the election itself, and the election's aftermath."
cixvii
 
Therefore, there is no reason to doubt that Saakashvili was very aware 
of the importance of keeping the events non-violent; if a revolution 
declared as non-violent anyway causes bloodshed on the part of the 
opposition movement, he would lose the real and expected support of 
both the people of Georgia and the West. Leaders may much of the 
time come to believe their own propaganda, but if their own words are 
opposed by their own behaviour, then their words would have little 
explanatory power. At the same time, Shevardnadze knew that if a 
single shot was be fired from the government's side, it would be 
described as an act of terror against his own people and democracy. 
Shevardnadze himself confirmed this point by saying "the coup was 
prepared over several months, everything was thought through in 
advance and everything was built on one idea—Shevardnadze won't 
spill blood."
clxviii
 If he had spilled the blood of people, Shevardnadze's 
government would have collapsed in any case; "it would collapse in 
an unpopular way; with bloodshed."
clxix
 This is why the government 
was unable to defend itself, even though it had brought the armed 
people from Adjaria there, to stand in front of demonstrators and 
protect their interests. Emil Adelkhanov argues that their presence 
there had only one aim: "...to show demonstrators that we are 
armed."
clxx
 Adelkhanov thinks that this was a fake strategy by the 
government because the opposition knew that as soon as these arms 
were fire, the government would lose the game. In that case, it would 
be a moral defeat for the government. 
One answer to the question why the revolution was non-violent is 
therefore that in Georgia, the use of violence would lead to loss of 
economical, political and moral support and therefore make it 
impossible to 'win' the conflict. 
3) The lessons learned from recent history 
To summarize, my analytical arguments have explained that the 
government and the opposition camps were discouraged from using 
violence because using violence by any side would bring victory to 
the other. In addition to this point I must say, there was an important 
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influence and lesson from recent history to the event as well. Because 
of Georgia's turbulent post-independence period, the consequences of 
violence were still fresh in people's memories, and this contributed to 
making people cautious and less violence-oriented by the time of the 
revolution. People were scared, as well as fed up of violence. 
Therefore, this lesson from the turbulent history limited the use of 
violence extremely during the massive disobedience on an individual 
level, e.g. in terms of revenge, pressure or tactics. This fact itself 
decreased the danger of civil war or radical division of the society 
(although as I mentioned in Chapter Five, according to Anke Hoeffler 
and Paul Collier's theory, there was a 29% chance of having civil war 
in Georgia). I can confidently say that it was actually the people's 
decision not to use violence. This fact itself played an important role, 
giving determination and reason to have non-violent events during 
November. 
According to Thomas Weber, "cleaving to non-violence in group 
social conflict situations may undercut the ability of the opponent to 
employ overly harsh measures of suppression or retaliation. If they 
make use of measures that appear to be disproportionately harsh, they 
run the risk of alienating not only neutrals but also, eventually, 
supporters and allies."
clxxi
 One of the main reasons for the non-violent 
revolution was that people knew the consequences of violence, or in 
Gandhi's words "people had the capacity for inner peaceful decision". 
People who decided to go out to the streets were not just a crowd. It 
was a citizen's decision to go out to protest against the regime without 
committing any violence. There were tens of thousands of people 
outside with very high civic caution. That was a fact that played an 
important part in the non-violent outcome.
clxxii
 Nino Makhashvili 
thinks that during the reconciliation projects, it is usually Georgian 
mothers who lost their sons for political, economical and social 
reasons are the most tolerant people. "These mothers knew how and 
what it means to experience sorrow. It was a character that we all had 
inside. Georgians had passed through hell, like a civil war and the 
ethnic wars" Makhashvili said. It was the nation's trauma, but 
meanwhile it had enriched them without knowing. It had made the 
people non-violent, and made the revolution possible. Nino 
Makhashvili also said "...we knew what violence might bring to 




 Indeed, there were many potential dangers for having a 
violent revolution, but according to many people, society itself 
avoided violent confrontation. The Georgian people showed at the end 
of the day their desires, activities and decisiveness as a mass to decide 
what happens. The masses saw their own strength. They cannot be 
accused that once again they had been used.
clxxiv
 Thus, another reason 
why the revolution was non-violent was the lessons learnt from 
history, which had made people anti-violent, aware and cautious. This 
factor may have been more important than any other factor mentioned 
in this thesis. 
4) The opposition's strategy and tactics 
The opposition movement, the media and civil society played an 
important role in cultivating civil participation and engagement in the 
political issues among ordinary Georgians starting from the beginning 
of 2003. However, according to the political culture of the Georgian 
people it took a while to convince them that it would not result in war 
or violence if they come out to protest. One of the successful tactics of 
the opposition movement was to make the protests a people's protest, 
mobilizing and bringing people from all over the country to Tbilisi. 
The size of the mass attracted even more international support, 
because listening to groups with a broad social base is one of the core 
ideas of democracy. Second, the size of the masses also encouraged 
government officials (police and bureaucrats) to show disobedience to 
the authorities. Third, the number of people showed that the 
government did not have a social base, which pushed them to step 
down peacefully. All these were important factors in making the 
revolution non-violent. More generally, my arguments in previous 
chapters have shown that the opposition's management skills, 
organization and education were essential contributions to the non-
violent character of the revolution, enabling them not only to gather 
the masses, but also to control and lead them in such a way that things 
did not get out of hand. 
Another successful tactic of the opposition was that they acted within 
the frame of law, following the constitutional order and requirements 
so that they prevented chaos after the storming into the parliament. In 
compliance with Article 76 of the Constitution of Georgia the Chair of 
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the Parliament of Georgia, Nino Burjanadze, implemented the duties 
of the president of Georgia.
clxxv
 Her immediate legal power takeover 
and prioritizing to maintain stability and to prepare new elections 
prevented the country from confrontations and chaos.
clxxvi
 A new 
president (04 January) and parliamentary elections (28 March) were 
planned for 2004. Since Nino Burjanadze was a co-leader of 
Burjanadze-Democrats Party taking an active part in the opposition 
movement against the Shevardnadze leadership, she was a 
representative of the winning side, the opposition, as well as the 
government as a Speaker. Besides this, the opposition movement's 
strategy was built on Gene Sharp's theory saying that the effective 
power of a ruler (Shevardnadze) may be limited by his subordinates 
(his corrupted circle) if they quietly block the relay downwards or 
execution of orders, or the passage of information from lower 
echelons upwards. Therefore, the opposition had intensified their 
direct and indirect communication (for security guaranty) with the 
government officials, namely with the police and military, after the 2 
November falsified elections. This tactic guaranteed the normal fun-
ctioning of the police and some other law-and-order maintaining 
institutions after the revolution as well as a non-violent attitude by the 
power structures. Except for a few high-ranking officials who 
disappeared, the infrastructure of police and other forces did not 
completely collapse on Shevardnadze's resignation; they were 
functioning, meeting people's and the opposition movement's interests. 
Another important opposition strategy was using the coordination 
theory of power; this theory argues that a political actor has power 
because it can coordinate social behaviour. Successful social 
coordination can create extraordinary power even in a weak 
public.
clxxvii
 Therefore, the social capital, or the feature of relations 
between persons that facilitate coordinated action among these 
persons, is needed. This kind of coordination was most appropriate to 
the political agenda of opposition leaders in Georgia. Using violence 
would cause chaos and disbelief, which would make it impossible to 
coordinate social behaviour. Therefore, all the tactics and strategies of 
the opposition were made socially friendly, where the role of people 
and their behaviour during the protests was always taken into 
consideration. 
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5) The psychological victory 
When Saakashvili led the group of opposition activists who stormed 
into the parliament, Shevardnadze was giving his opening speech, 
blessing the new "elected" parliamentary members. Eyewitnesses and 
participants say that, initially, the guard would not open the gate of the 
parliament for opposition supporters to enter the building. "They 
asked for some kind of legitimate ground for that, but then opposition 
MPs came and told them to open and they did it because "...opposition 
MPs had supporters among the guards from the inside."
clxxviii
 The fact 
that guards opened the doors by themselves to the opposition activists 
contributed and led to a non-violent revolution. Until the moment of 
the parliament storming, the revolution had not yet started: it was 
simply a demonstration that the united opposition movement was 
organizing. Until that moment, people had assembled in front of the 
parliament and sent messages and slogans out to the government. It 
was a passive action, but when people witnessed an action on the field 
and a symbol of overcoming the psychological barrier, such as taking 
the parliament under control and driving away Shevardnadze, people 
started to celebrate the victory. Although Shevardnadze did not 
officially resign from his post until many hours after the storming of 
the parliament, the psychological victory and celebration mood in the 
nation discouraged any attempt to take control again by Shevar-
dnadze's loyal officials. 
6) International factors 
The international causes of revolution lie much more in the economic, 
social and ideological fields than in the narrowly political; when states 
directly cause revolution. In Georgia, international factors played an 
important role in formulating the non-violent attitude and behaviour of 
the government and the opposition. Both the opposition and the 
government were dependent on international financial aid. Losing this 
source would anyway lead to losing the political competition in the 
end. The Georgian economy was on the verge of complete bankruptcy 
by November 2003, so the government could not afford to lose 
international financial aid and credits. At the same time, the oppose-
tion movement was also dependent on foreign financial aid in order to 
survive. To organize the demonstrations and retain the party structure 
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and branches active in the districts, they needed funding. Besides this, 
international political pressures also limited the government and the 
opposition's ability to resort to violent means. Having democratic 
elections and maintaining security and order in the country was a 
common demand made of the government and the opposition by 
almost every foreign diplomatic institution. 
7) Civil society 
During Georgia's electoral revolution, the success of the democratic 
opposition depended upon the help of civil society. The role of Kmara 
within organizational support and the role of the media from a 
mobilisation perspective in particular were exceptional. Civil society 
and the media played a very educative role by emphasizing non-
violent methods to solve political problems in the pre-revolutionary 
Georgian society. As I mentioned in Chapter Five, the Kmara 
movement did tremendous work in cultivating the civil participation 
of people (especially the rural population) in politics. The Liberty 
Institute in particular played an important role in discrediting and 
dissolving the prestige myth of Shevardnadze in the eyes of people. 
The media, particularly the Rustavi 2 channel, played an important 
role in coordinating the masses and being the mouthpiece of the 
opposition. Through these channels, the opposition leaders had access 
to large parts of society, campaigning on their platform and pursuing 
their propaganda. 
8) The opposition leaders' personal contacts and relationship with 
the governmentofficials 
The role of disobedient officials was as important for the character of 
the outcome as all other available supports the opposition camp had 
from the outside. Saakashvili, Zhvania and 
Burjanadze had been high-ranking officials of the Shevardnadze 
government until very recent years. This fact also played a big role in 
the successful/non-violent nature since even officials loyal to 
Shevardnadze knew and worked with them. Saakashvili, Zhvania and 
Burjanadze were not random opposition leaders but former colleagues 
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of government officials, and this probably made it easier to convince 
the officials (their "old friends") to support the revolution. 
9) Shevardnadze's personal contribution 
By looking at this electoral revolution it becomes clear that 
Shevardnadze was his own gravedigger. Georgians were fed up with 
the wars, misery and corruption that had rained their lives and 
damaged their societies. Its recent history had at least, witnessed the 
catastrophic experience of war and social dislocation. Even though 
Shevardnadze to some extent was a democratic leader, allowing the 
development of the civil society and media the poverty, social 
injustice, corruption and the cynicism of power were too much for 
people to forget. While the "Revolution of Roses" was generally 
unexpected, it had become clear much earlier that the November 2003 
elections would be a critical juncture for Georgia and could lead to 
deep political crisis unless conditions for free and fair elections were 
created. 
Georgian society had become very deeply traumatized during the 
recent turbulent years. Shevardnadze's team showed less and less 
eagerness and impulse regarding starting to change the economic, 
social and political conditions in the country. Some people think that 
Shevardnadze thought about how to achieve an integrated and unified 
Georgia in the future. Therefore, he collected all these horribly corrupt 
politicians who did not like Georgia and always put their own interest 
above the interest of the Georgian nation, in order to sink their 
political careers as one ship, and, as captain, sink with them. The 
purpose was to let a new generation of politicians come to power 
without the old guard standing in their way. 
In addition, official Tbilisi had practically lost control over three 
regions (the Abkhazia and South Ossetia breakaway areas, and 
Abashidze controlled Ajaria) of the country. Shevardnadze seems to 
have realized that he was not able to unify Georgia because Russia 
was involved in and supported all these three regions. This was a very 
challenging situation, where the only apparent way out was to obtain 
support from the West. However, this was difficult because of 
Georgia's reputation as a failed state, and Shevardnadze's wandering 
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between dictatorship and democracy. Therefore, the non-violent 
revolution was needed to make Georgia popular in the West; as the 
first, successful example of non-violent revolution in a post-Soviet 
society. With Western support, Georgia could unify the country and 
neutralize Russia's negative influence. 
This thesis has argued through the most important factors, as well as 
strategies and tactics that had planning and organizational elements. 
But for the Tetri Melia (White Fox), a revolution was the only way to 
get rid of all these corrupt, rich and dangerous people. It seems he 
suddenly understood the consequences of his not being hard-handed 
and letting these officials do all these horrible things. Although he 
always wandered between democracy and an authoritarian style of 
ruling the government, he did not trust the parliamentary system. 
Shevardnadze believed that a centralized political system with one 
strong leader was better for Georgia. Therefore, "Shewy" decided to 
resign in order to let Saakashvili get the leadership. At the age of 75, 
the White Fox did not have much to lose, and accordingly he could 
contribute to making a coup from the inside and a revolution from the 
outside to make Georgia the first motherland for nonviolent revolution 
in a post Soviet society. 
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Summary 
THE GEORGIAN ROSE REVOLUTION CHALLENGERES AND 
SUPPORTS FOR ENSURUNG THE NON-VIOLENT OUTCOME IN 





The Georgian Revolution, popularly named the Rose Revolution, took place in 
Tbilisi on 23 November 2003. It began in the form of street protests in the capital 
of the country against the falsification of the November 2003 parliamentary 
election, and culminated in the storming of the Georgian Parliament and the 
resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze. The most astonishing feature of this 
revolution is that it was the first of its kind in a former Soviet country, and the 
starting point for a new generation of nonviolent revolutions in the countries who 
shared the same political culture in the past. 
This research paper is a case-study about the Georgian revolution, and its primary 
aim is to discuss how the revolution could happen non-violently. The theoretical 
basis of the study is based on the theories of Gene Sharp, "the methods of 
nonviolent action, protest and persuasion for power and struggle", Johan Gaining, 
"triangle conflict theory" and Gandhi, "non-violent action by marching forces." 
The Georgian revolution is the outcome of many factors, such as the political, 
economic and social situation in the country as well as the recent history and the 
personality of the leaders. These factors made the ground ready for the revolution 
to happen, but the research also shows that the strategy and tactics of the 
opposition movement played a decisive role for the nonviolent outcome. The most 
important challenge for the non-violent revolution was the danger of civil war, and 
loosing control over the demonstrators. Meanwhile, there were supports for the 
revolution as well, the most important ones being external pressures and support, 
the media and the civil society. The research shows that the answer to the question 
'what made the Georgian revolution nonviolent?', does not lie in one unique fact or 
reason, but rather a combination of factors, strategies and tactics. The November 
events had organizational and planning elements, but the success of the revolution 
was dependent on massive individual participation, showing that defending 
democracy is ultimately in the hands of the people. However, one not less 
important factor is Shevardnadze's contributions to his own fall. The Georgian 
Rose Revolution was nonviolent because it was a coup from inside as well as a 
revolution from outside. 
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